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ABSTRACT
Contracting Officer's Technical Representatives (COTRs)
are assigned by the contracting officer to provide technical
direction/clarification and monitor Indefinite Delivery Type
Contract (IDTC) performance at the location where the con-
tractor performs services. This type of service contract
frequently has a vague statement of work (SOW) and can
employ either fixed price or cost reimbursable delivery
orders. The stability and effectiveness of the COTR work
force which administers these service contracts is greatly
enhanced by proper qualification standards and training;
however, the "more training" philosophy is only one way to
reinstate the intent of the COTR program. This study will
examine current Department of the Navy (DON) and Naval
Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) policies, guidance, and
practices pertaining to the implementation of the COTR work
force in the administration of IDTCs and suggest ways the
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The implementation of the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) Circular No. A-76, "Performance of Commercial
Activities," has reduced the Federal Government's reliance
on in-house assets to perform various technical and mainte-
nance services. In response to OMB's direction to seek the
support of competitive private enterprise, the Navy Field
Contracting System (NFCS) has shifted its reliance to the
contracting out of these services to commercial businesses.
These service contracts directly engage the time and
effort of contractors whose primary purpose is to carry out
identifiable assignments rather than supply specific
materials under the terms of the contract. Of the many
types of contract methods available for use by the procuring
contracting officer (PCO), Indefinite Delivery Type
Contracts (IDTCs) "are the major type of contract used in
the NFCS for services on other than a firm fixed-price (FFP)
basis" [Ref. l:p. 1]. Indefinite Delivery Type Contracts,
or IDTCs, specify the types of services to be furnished by a
contractor upon receipt of delivery orders written against
the IDTC from ordering officers at customer activities.
While a conveniently shorter administrative leadtime is a
benefit of this contract type, post-award actions can be
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quite involved. Procurement Management Reviews (PMRs) of
NFCS activities frequently cite contract administration
discrepancies related to IDTC misinterpretations and abuses.
As service contracts increase in number and expand in
scope, the related complexities of contract administration
also grow. One of the most difficult issues in the adminis-
tration of service contracts occurs when the customer
requesting the service is not co-located with the contract-
ing officer. Depending on the degree of technical direction
required, type of contract and level of surveillance neces-
sary, the remote customer can incur the responsibility of
having to nominate an individual from his own activity to
administer the contract. This individual is called the
Contracting Officer's Technical Representative (COTR). In
his efforts to administer the contract, the COTR can
encounter problems stemming from the complexity of the con-
tractual arrangement (since he is not the PCO), as well as
from his relationship with his supervisor and the PCO to
whom he is jointly responsible.
B. OBJECTIVES
This research effort is a study on the administration of
Indefinite Delivery Type Contracts (IDTCs) through the
Contracting Officer's Technical Representatives (COTRs).
The key points to be analyzed are the compilation of COTR-
related discrepancies found in recent Procurement Management
2
Reviews (PMRs) of West Coast Navy Field Contracting System
(NFCS) activities. By reviewing these deficiencies on a
composite basis, significant systemic issues can be more
easily separated from superficial administrative errors of a
topical nature. The end goal is the development of resolu-
tions to cure or reduce both policy and procedural problems
with regard to the management of COTRs. This consolidated
list of common COTR/IDTC discrepancies will be offered as a
guide for contracting personnel to assist in their efforts
to meet NAVSUP-directed contract administration require-
ments. In addition, this list of discrepancies will be used
as an input to the tailoring of screen formats for the
development of a computerized COTR management/contractor
performance reporting program at Naval Regional Contracting
Center, San Diego, California.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question
What are the key problems associated with the
administration of Indefinite Delivery Type Contracts (IDTCs)
for services and how might these problems be resolved?
2. Secondary Research Questions
* What is an IDTC?
* What role do COTRs have in the administration of IDTCs?
* What are the significant deficiencies in the Contract-
ing Officer/COTR/Ordering Officer/Contractor
relationship with regard to the administration of
IDTCs?
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* How might these deficiencies be addressed to better
manage the COTRs' administration of IDTCs?
D. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
The scope of this thesis encompasses current Naval
Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) policy and practices
pertaining to the implementation of the COTR work force in
the administration of nonpersonal service contracts with
several limitations.
First, data analysis has been restricted to the policy
and management deficiencies that have surfaced in Procure-
ment Management Review (PMR) findings of West Coast NFCS
activities during fiscal years 1988, 1989, and the first
quarter of 1990.
Second, while COTRs can be required to administer "C"-
type contracts which obligate full funding up front in the
contract and require the contractor to perform based on
definitized quantities, deliveries and specific statements
of work (SOWs), this thesis will analyze the COTR work
force's administration of "D"-type indefinite delivery-type
contracts which obligate incremental funds and require the
contractor to perform when delivery orders are written to
specify delivery times, locations, and/or quantities. More-
over, an IDTC should not be confused with a Basic Ordering
Agreement (BOA). An IDTC is a contract in which prices
and/or estimated costs have been analyzed and deemed fair
and reasonable prior to the contract award. Obligations
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occur when unilateral delivery orders are placed against the
IDTC without the requirement for further competition or
justification. A BOA, however, requires competition or a
Justification and Approval (J&A) each time an order is
placed since the BOA is not an actual contract until the
task order is issued. By itself, the BOA is only a broad
agreement with a contractor to meet certain terms and condi-
tions. It specifies the types of services that can be
furnished by the contractor pending the receipt of a
bilaterally determined task order.
Third, the primary emphasis will be on Type II delivery
orders placed against IDTCs with cost reimbursable features
vice Type I delivery orders placed against fixed-price
IDTCs.
Several assumptions have been made. First, the findings
and recommendations of these PMRs are assumed to be well-
founded. Second, it is assumed the reader possesses a basic
knowledge of contracting terms and language in addition to
the NFCS procurement organization and process.
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Primary research was limited to the review of key
deficiencies cited in PMR reports for West Coast NFCS
activities. Within this framework, interviews were
exclusively limited to issues regarding the management of
COTRs, COTR/Contracting Officer interaction, and the
5
contract administration of IDTCs. Appendix A provides a
list of questions asked during interviews.
Secondary research included a review of written policy
and guidance within the Department of the Navy (DON).
Data were gathered through:
Review of current DOD policy and guidance concerning
the administration of Indefinite Delivery Type
Contracts (IDTCs) through the Contracting Officer's
Technical Representative (COTR) work force.
Review of literature pertaining to IDTCs and COTRs
drawn from the Defense Logistics Studies Information
Center, Fort Lee, Virginia, Federal Legal Information
Through Electronics (FLITE) Data Base, Lowry Air Force
Base, Colorado, and the Library of the Naval
Postgraduate School.
* Review of procurement management reviews (PMRs) of West
Coast Navy Field Contracting System (NFCS) activities.
* Field trips to and observations of COTR management at
the Naval Regional Contracting Center San Diego,
California and Naval Supply Center Oakland, California.
* Telephone discussions and interviews with NFCS con-
tracting officers, PMR inspectors, NFCS COTR
instructors, COTRs, and their supervisors.
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
The thesis is divided into four chapters. This chapter
has provided an overview of the contract administration
environment in which COTR management issues are cradled. It
has also outlined the framework within which the thesis
examines these issues. Chapter II defines and discusses
IDTC/COTR policies and procedures that impact the adminis-
tration of service contracts. Common COTR-related Procure-
ment Management Review findings are listed and analyzed in
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Chapter III. Chapter IV summarizes the research and
provides conclusions and recommendations to reduce both
policy-driven and procedural problems with regard to the
management of COTRs.
G. SUMMARY
This chapter has identified the background for this
thesis. The reader has been acquainted with the purpose and
methodology of the research. The next chapter will
introduce policies and procedures involving the use of IDTCs
and COTRs.
7




This chapter defines the policies and procedures which
support the use of Indefinite Delivery Type Contracts (IDTCs)
and mandates the use of Contracting Officer's Technical
Representatives (COTRs) for service contracts. First, it
will discuss the background leading up to the award of a
service contract and the selection of the contract type.
Second, the advantages and disadvantages of IDTCs will be
presented. Finally, the responsibilities and processes
associated with the nomination, appointment, performance,
monitoring and coordination of COTRs will be addressed.
B. SERVICE CONTRACTS
Service contracts are used to purchase the time,
knowledge, and expertise of contractors. Time is easily
definable in a contract, but knowledge and expertise
requirements are more difficult to describe. These
performance requirements are expressed in a statement of work
(SOW) which attempts to quantify the service, study, or
research and development effort required of the contractor.
Depending on the service required, the procuring contracting
officer (PCO) must determine what type of contract will be
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most advantageous to the Government. The SOW must be speci-
fic enough to allow contractors to bid competitively on a
level playing field, but generic enough to accommodate some
flexibility in the performance of a service. Numerous
problems can occur with regard to the SOW, especially in
multifunctional "umbrella" service contracts with overlap-
ping SOWs; however, these types of contracts are beyond the
scope of this thesis.
Because (the PCO is) procuring expertise rather than
materials or supplies, the source selection criteria must
be different. When procuring materials and supplies, it
is preferable to go low cost technically acceptable,
because the specifications can be very exact, depending on
the requirement. It can be just the opposite with
services. The corporate management expertise and
technical knowledge contained within a service's
organization must be proportional to its policies,
reputation, and commitment to professionalism and quality
assurance. For this reason, and the fact that most
service efforts are not 100% definable, it is typically
preferable to use a best value selection criteria. [Ref.
2:p. 15]
During the pre-solicitation phase of the procurement, it
must be determined whether or not a contract administration
plan (CAP) is needed. A CAP must be developed when either
one or both of the following criteria exist:
* A COTR will be required to assist with the contract
The requiring activity is to be delegated authority by
the PCO "to perform specific duties or significant
tasks related to contract administration.. .other than
inspection and acceptance." [Ref. 4:p. 3]
A separate CAP is necessary for each service contract that
meets the previous criteria; however, if an activity utilizes
similar contract administration assignments on a recurrent
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basis, then the activity can be allowed to draw up a Master
CAP to cover particular categories or types of requirements.
To initiate the process, the requiring activity must
submit a "Documentation Form for Contract Administration
Plan" concurrently with the submission of its Request for
Contractual Procurement (RCP). This form is used to:
* Specify areas requiring technical expertise to assure
quality, adequate performance, and contract completion
* Nominate the COTR
* Cite the specific duties, qualifications, and proposed
responsibilities and limitations of ordering officers
* State any internal control measures that have been
established at the requiring activity to monitor the
performance of on-site personnel with delegated
responsibilities
* Address repetitive requirements which might facilitate
the development of a Master CAP or change the current
Master CAP. [Ref. 5:pp. 3-4]
Appendix B, Part I, provides a sample check-off list the
requiring activity must submit to the PCO.
When the PCO receives the information listed in the
previous paragraph, he must liaison with the requiring
activity (and contract administration office (CAO), if neces-
sary) to develop the CAP. The goal of the CAP is to achieve
effective administration and avoid duplication of functions
by efficiently coordinating the assignment of responsibili-
ties. A well-coordinated effort is required to:
...ensure that all contract administration functions are
assigned; suit the specific circumstances of the contract;
and give due consideration to the type of contract, the
place of performance, the period of performance, and
10
inspection and acceptance criteria to be stated in the
contract. [Ref. 4:p. 4]
Appendix B, Part II, provides a check-off list the PCO must
complete in the pre-solicitation phase of the procurement.
During the solicitation process, the PCO must consider
funding constraints, schedule requirements, lead times,
competition goals, and contract administration responsibili-
ties when choosing a contract type. Table 1 lists the func-
tional areas and participants with which PCOs must interplay.
If the purchase request is for a service contract which will
require a COTR, the PCO should get him involved as early as
possible in acquisition planning since the COTR will become
the primary agent responsible for the performance of the con-
tract. The COTR has a vested interest in ensuring all the
needs for the service are addressed in the solicitation and
should play a key role in developing a CAP that is actually
achievable. Guidelines for developing a CAP are listed in
Appendix C. In Appendix D is a sample CAP for a complex IDTC
Time and Materials solicitation. Both appendices were taken
from the NAVSUP Instruction 4330.7, "Service Contract
Administration."
C. INDEFINITE DELIVERY TYPE CONTRACT
Once the PCO determines exactly what the customer
requires, he must decide whether to procure services through
the use of a definitive "C"-type contract or an indefinite
delivery "D"-type contract. Either type of contract may
11
TABLE 1
FUNCTIONAL AREAS AND PARTICIPANTS WITH WHICH THE PROCURING
CONTRACTING OFFICER (PCO) MUST INTERFACE FOR
SERVICE CONTRACTS
SERVICE PLANNING RESPONSIBILITIES REQUIRING COm L ISCALACTIVrTY OT _A FC
PLANNING
Requirements I. D, X X
Contract Type X X
Contract Duration X X
Competition Considerations X X
Source Selection X X
COST DEVELOPMENT
Govt Estimate Preparation X X X
* Level of detail X X
* Contract type X X
* General considerations X X X X
Pudgeting X X x
* Level of detail x x x x
* Time frames X X X x
* Relationship to tasking X X X
* Assumptions & conditions X X X x
Funding
* Application to Service Contracts X X X
Act
Level of Work Planning X X X
PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS
Statement of Work X X X
Data & Other Deliverables X X X
Quality Assurance X X X
Govt Furnished Property X X X
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
Contract Administration X X X
Classified Information X X X
Source: [Ref. 2:p. 19]
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require the assignment of a COTR; however, as previously
introduced, this thesis is limited to a discussion of the
indefinite delivery "D"-type contract. For clarification
purposes, their differences are stated again. The term "C"
contract includes all contract tasking with definitive quan-
tities, deliveries and statements of work. Type "D"
contracts (IDTCs) identify the estimated costs, prices and
kinds of services to be delivered, but are prevented by
uncertainty at the time of contract award from stating the
precise quantities and/or delivery schedules. Delivery
orders are used to place specific and detailed orders against
IDTCs.
Any fixed-price or cost-reimbursable pricing mechanism or
combination of pricing mechanism cited in Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) Part 16 can be utilized by the PCO to effect
an IDTC. Many factors play a part in the selection of the




* Period of Performance
* Technical Capability
* Financial Responsibility
* Type/Complexity/Urgency of Requirement. [Ref. 3:pp. 16-
1--2]
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The primary decision hinges on the determination of financial
risk. Firm fixed-price (FFP) contracts are best used when
requirements are easily definable and predictable. Cost
reimbursable contracts are appropriate when a high degree of
uncertainty exists. When any incentive-type contract is
selected (except FFP), the PCO must write a Determination and
Finding (D&F) to state why that particular contract type is
most advantageous to the Government. The IDTC must include
all applicable clauses for each mechanism, whether it is a
fixed price or cost reimbursement contract.
Once the IDTC (fixed-price or cost-reimbursement) is
determined, a decision must be made whether to retain
delivery order authority at the contracting activity or to
delegate it to ordering officers at the customer activity.
If ordering authority is delegated, the ordering officer must
be "appointed in writing by the appointing official at the
designated ordering activity." [Ref. 4:p. 2] Upon the
subsequent determination of delivery schedule, location,
and/or quantity specifics, PCOs or ordering officers at the
customer activities issue delivery orders to contractors for
the services specified in the basic IDTC. By placing orders,
and thereby obligating funds, ordering officers essentially
act as contracting officers within the limitations of their
appointed authority and within the ordering limitations
assigned in the IDTC.
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It is highly recommended that the contracting officer's
activity retains ordering authority for delivery orders if
the pricing mechanism for the IDTC is other than FFP [Ref.
l:p. 10]. The reasons for this are threefold. First,
delivery orders for other than FFP services are complex and
can become controversial if they do not adequately clarify
the Government's requirements of the contractor. They must
specify and detail these requirements:
... within the scope of the basic contract and avoid organi-
zational conflicts of interests, personal services,
inappropriate use of funds, and commodity buying outside
the organizational mission. [Ref. l:p. 9]
Second, the delegation of ordering authority reduces the
control the PCO has over the contract. No longer in direct
control of the contract, the PCO must ensure that the desig-
nated ordering officer is qualified, skilled and trained to a
level commensurate with the limits of his ordering authority
[Ref. l:p. 9]. Third, though the ordering officer is
formally appointed as the PCO's delegate, the PCO:
... remain(s) ultimately accountable for the actions taken
by authorized ordering activities under the PCO's
contract(s). Accordingly, whenever possible, PCOs should
conduct post-award conference/training with activities
authorized to place orders against their IDTC. [Ref. 1:p.
10]
Total funding under an IDTC cannot be predicted because
there is usually no limit to the number of delivery orders
(with the exception of Definite Quantity Contracts), which
may be placed against it. Therefore, it is necessary that:
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... funds obligated, labor hours expended, costs incurred,
etc., are carefully tracked (on spread sheets) for each
contract year/period of performance.. .by the Contracting
Officer, designated ordering officer(s) and COTR.... In
addition, each ordering activity should assemble a file
with a copy of the contract and its applicable modifica-
tions, and all contract spread sheets for ordering officer
reference. Once orders are placed against the contract,
they too, should be inserted in this file and the spread
sheet modified to reflect each order. [Ref. 1:p. 10]
Ordering officers provide copies of the delivery orders to
the PCO at the contracting activity for filing and to keep
him informed. Appendices E and F are examples of spread
sheets for cost-reimbursement and time and material
contracts, respectively.
Delivery order limitations, ordring procedures and a
list of the activities authorized to issue orders under the
IDTC as well as the name and responsibilities of the COTR are
identified in Section H of the contract [Ref. l:p. 10]. The
placement of these delivery orders is considered a unilateral
right of the Government as long as it falls within the scope
of the contract. Fixed-price orders placed against IDTCs for
services are classified as Type I delivery orders; whereas,
cost-reimbursable orders placed against IDTCs are classified
as Type II delivery orders [Ref. 5:p. 1.6-16].
While IDTCs were initially used to buy large quantities
of standard and repetitive commercial items, innovative
applications of this contract type for a myriad of other
purposes have become standard fare. Figure 1 highlights the
16
flexible qualities of the IDTC and illustrates the three
forms an IDTC can take.





l 3. INDEFINITE QUANTITY
TWO DELIVERY ORDER TYPES
NO DELIVERY ORDERS I. TYPE I - FIXED - PRICE
2. TYPE H - COST - REIMB.
Figure 1. Contract Types
Subpart 16.5 of the FAR describes and discusses the
application of each form. They are briefly addressed in Part
216.5 of the Department of Defense FAR Supplement (DFARS).
The current Navy Acauisition Procedures Supplement (NAPS)
provides no further guidance or amplification. An IDTC hand-
book, NAVSUP Publication 570 Indefinite Delivery Type
Contract Guidebook, published in 1988, is available to
"acquaint (contracting officers) with the principles applica-
ble to such contracts so that (they) can avoid some of the
(controversy and disputes) which may be encountered" [Ref.
l:p. 1].
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The following discussion is derived from the FAR Part
16.5 and the NAVSUP Publication 570 addresses the advantages
and disadvantages of each of these three IDTC forms.
1. Definite Quantity Contract (ID-DO)
This form of contract supports the performance of
specific services at designated locations for a given
contract period. Since the actual performance schedules are
unknown at the time of award, subsequent delivery orders are
relied upon to identify the times at which the services are
required. Though the delivery orders specify performance
dates and quantities, the prices are determined in the basic
contract. Definite quantity contracts are useful when the
services needed are immediately available on-call or can be
obtained within a short time.
a. Advantages
* Offers flexibility with regard to both scheduling and
number of service calls up to the limits specified in
the contract
* Limits the obligation of the Government and permits more
efficient ordering since services do not have to be
acquired until after the need materializes
* Provides a more stable price platform from which to
negotiate since the contract ensures the contractor a
firm minimum quantity
* Requires less administrative effort than individual
contracts.
b. Disadvantages
* Requires funding up to the minimum quantity specified by
the contract
18
* Limits the Government to the use of only one source for
the duration of the contract performance period
* Requires strict monitoring and accounting of each
order's financial obligation to ensure they remain
within the limits of the delivery orders cited in the
contract
* Calls for more administrative effort and cost than a
definitized "C" contract in which the time and place
are specifically established up front by technical
direction letters.
2. Requirements Contract (ID-RC)
This form of contract supports exclusive delivery
from one supplier of specified services for a fixed period of
time. In other words, once the contract is in place, the
contractor is treated as a sole source for all of the
services specified in the contract. Special care must be
taken to ensure the SOW is well-defined and does not overlap
any IDTCs with similar SOWs. A breach of contract can occur
if parallels can be drawn between SOWs. Since firm delivery
dates and quantities are not known at the time of award, the
issuance of delivery orders are relied upon to identify the
required times and quantities of services. Requirements
contracts are useful when the Government anticipates repeti-
tive services, but cannot precisely define the quantities
needed during the contract performance period. In this form
of an IDTC, the Government provides a good faith estimate
based on past experience and future needs of the total
deliveries expected to be required during the specified
contract time, but unlike the definite quantity contract, the
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Government is not held accountable to order any particular
quantity. The contract does establish a maximum delivery
order limit, if practicable, above which the contractor is no
longer unilaterally committed to perform. Additionally, a
limit may be placed on the amount the Government may order
during a certain period of time. Finally, the contract may
specify a minimum quantity that the Government must obligate
per individual service order given considerations to economy
and efficiency.
a. Advantages
Offers flexibility with regard to times and quantities
of service deliveries up to the limits specified in the
contract
Limits the obligation of the Government and permits more
efficient ordering since services do not have to be
funded until actual needs become known
* Requires no minimum order guarantee
Facilities procurement efforts by requiring less
administrative burden than individual contracts
Produces savings to the Government through price
advantages over individual contracts since requirement
contracts represent a greater potential to the
contractor for consolidated service requirements.
b. Disadvantages
Requires strict monitoring and accounting of each
order's financial obligation to ensure they remain
within the limits of the delivery orders cited in the
contract
Limits the Government to the use of one source for the
duration of the contract performance period. This in
turn leaves the Government vulnerable to unsatisfactory
performance that can take a substantial amount of time
to fix
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* Relies on best estimates based on prior demands and
anticipated needs requirements. These can unnecessarily
constrain order limits during unstable demand patterns
when a higher than estimated number of orders are
required
* Possesses the potential for breach of contract legal
actions if another contract is awarded with a similar
SOW.
3. Indefinite Ouantity Contracts (ID-IO)
This form of contract supports delivery of an
indefinite quantity of designated services for a specified
contract period. Whereas a requirements contract has no
guaranteed minimum, this contract requires a minimum obliga-
tion by the Government at the time of contract execution
whether any delivery orders are ever placed against it or
not. Subsequent delivery orders are relied upon to identify
the delivery schedules, designate the specific performance
quantities and obligate funds above the minimum value already
obligated. Prices and estimated costs are set in the basic
contract. The basic contract also states a maximum quantity
above which the contractor is not obligated to perform.
Indefinite Quantity Contracts are useful when the minimum
amount of required services can be predicted with reasonable
accuracy at the time of contract award. The FAR recommends
that this particular form of contract only be utilized for




Limits initial obligation of Government funds to the
minimum quantity cited in the basic contract with
subsequent delivery orders obligating additional funds
as necessary
Permits more efficient ordering since services, beyond
the minimum, do not have to be funded until actual needs
materialize
Allows the Government to seek the business of other
contractors for the same services when the minimum order
guarantee is satisfied
Allows the Government to stop the issuance of delivery
orders once the minimum order quantity is met without
the administrative undertakings associated with contract
terminations
Produces savings to the Government through price
advantages based on quantity discounts in comparison to
individual contract actions
Eases the procurement effort by requiring less adminis-
trative burden than individual contracts
Offers flexibility with regard to times and quantities
of service deliveries within the limits specified in the
contract.
b. Disadvantages
Requires the obligation of sufficient funds to cover the
guaranteed minimum amount upon the initial execution of
the contract
Necessitates strict monitoring and accounting of each
order's financial obligation to ensure they remain
within the limits of the delivery orders cited in the
contract
* Restricts the minimum and maximum quantities the
Government may buy.
In summary, the IDTC provides the best instrument
for ordering services when the requirements for delivery and/
or quantity are unpredictable and cannot be made firm prior
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to contract award. Furthermore, after the basic contract is
in place, the IDTC eliminates the need to compete repetitive
requirements. This hastens the procurement administrative
lead time (PALT) and alleviates the need to negotiate on an
order by order basis.
D. CONTRACTING OFFICER'S TECHNICAL REPRESENTATIVE
1. Policy
a. Framework
The distribution of contract administration is
addressed in FAR Subpart 42.2 and DFARS Subpart 242.2. These
regulations basically state that the assignment of contract
administration can be retained by the PCO's activity or
delegated to a separate supporting contract administration
office (CAO), usually the Defense Contract Administrative
Services (DCAS). If the PCO retains contract administration
responsibilities, then he must determine if he needs techni-
cal assistance in order to administer the contract properly.
This is the framework on which the Secretary of Navy (SECNAV)
and Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) policies both
derive their requirements for a COTR.
A COTR is not necessary for every IDTC. Whether
or not a COTR is required depends on several factors. The
SECNAV Instruction (SECNAVINST) 4200.27 states:
Appointment of a COTR for a service or research and
development (R&D) contract may be necessary if:
(1) Technical direction is necessary to clarify/define
or give specific direction within the statement of work.
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This will often be true of contracts for engineering
services and R&D.
(2) Unusual monitoring and surveillance, beyond that
which a CAO can provide, is required. Many "commercial
activity" contracts, such as food, guard, and maintenance
service contracts, are in this category. [Ref. 6:p. 2]
The NAVSUP policy changes tone and differs somewhat from the
SECNAV guidance in that the NAVSUP Instruction (NAVSUPINST)
4205.3 "requires" that COTRs be designated when any of the
above stipulations occur. In addition, the NAVSUPINST 4205.3
adds a third category to its list of conditions requiring a
COTR when: "Type II delivery orders... are to be used to
require performance under an indefinite delivery type
contract" [Ref. 7:p. 2].
b. Responsibilities
Both policies burden the PCO with the responsi-
bility to ensure the individual he appoints as COTR possesses
the attributes of a competent technical advisor. The NAVSUP
policy further stipulates that the PCO's responsibilities
include assurance that the COTR has attended requisite
NAVSUP-approved training and that the COTR "holds a position
of responsibility commensurate with the complexity/technical
requirements of the contract" [Ref. 7:p. 2]. The PCO must
ensure that the COTR maintains an arms-length relationship
with the contractor and avoids any actions which might be
misconstrued or give the appearance of a personal service
contract. In a similar fashion, the PCO must ensure that a
sufficient separation of functional responsibilities is
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preserved between the duties of the COTR and ordering
officer. For example, he must make certain that if a COTR's
duties involve assisting the ordering officer with the
origination of a requirement, then that COTR cannot be
assigned to approve the performance of the same contract.
Care should be taken so that undue concentrations of respon-
sibilities do not cause overlaps and make contracts vulner-
able to conflicts of interests and other abuses.
The NAVSUPINST 4205.3 also calls for the PCO to
include contractor monthly reporting requirements in any
contract which designates a COTR:
...to provide an adequate basis for the COTR to monitor
contract performance....The report shall require informa-
tion such as the number of hours expended, the total costs
incurred, the average hourly rate incurred, accomplishments
to date, data status and delivery, etc. The report shall
be sent to the PCO, COTR and the Ordering Officer (if
applicable). This requirement can be fulfilled by inclu-
sion of a data requirement on the DD Form 1423 (Contractor
Data Requirements List). [Ref. 7:p. 4]
The responsibilities of the COTR entail many
facets. Acting as a technical liaison, he is the contrac-
tor's primary point of contact in the Government for any
technical issues or problems that may need to be interpreted
or relayed to the PCO. As a monitor of the contractor's per-
formance, the COTR inspects and accepts. He ensures resumes
and labor mixes match contract specifications. He keeps
track of cumulative hours incurred against the contract by
labor category and compares them with estimates and
negotiated hours. He is a watchdog looking for fraud, waste
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and abuse as well as a surveillant overseer observing the
contractor's compliance or noncompliance with the contract's
terms and conditions. When a COTR detects deficiencies in
the contractor's rate of performance or quality of service,
he reports them to the PCO. The PCO relies on him to assist
in the process of contract modifications when changes are
required to the basic IDTC. Ordering officers rely on their
expertise with changes to delivery orders. The COTR must be
alert as to what falls within the scope of work defined in
the basic contract and what constitutes new procurement.
Documentation duties also accompany these respon-
sibilities. The SECNAV guidance states that COTRs should
report to the PCO "periodically" the total hours accumulated
in each labor category resulting from task orders [Ref. 6:p.
3]. The NAVSUP instruction includes additional responsibili-
ties for the submission of written reports and the mainte-
nance of files by the COTR. The reports must be submitted
within 60 days of contract completion, but no less than once
a year. They should include all documentation related to
COTR actions and "address all aspects of contractor perform-
ance including cost effectiveness, quality and timeliness of
contractor performance" [Ref. 7:p. 5]. The files should be
maintained by the COTR in contract and/or delivery order
sequence and be comprised of:
... documentation relative to the actions taken as COTR....
(to) include (a) copy of (the) contract and/or delivery
order; modifications; and when applicable, documentation on
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technical clarification and direction provided to the
contractor; documentation regarding disposition of Govern-
ment furnished material/property and classified material;
documentation regarding contractor performance. [Ref. 7:p.
5]
Appendix G provides a more inclusive list of COTR responsi-
bilities.
The current COTR policy prevents the PCO from
assuming that all of his contract administration burdens will
be taken care of by the COTR. According to SECNAV,
... technical personnel are a scarce and expensive resource
... (therefore) ... It is inappropriate to utilize technical
personnel as contract administrators. Assignment of
clerical or routine administrative duties to the COTR shall
be minimized. [Ref. 6:p. 3]
Both SECNAV and NAVSUP policies limit the COTR's responsibil-
ities to "technical direction/clarification and administra-
tive duties within the scope of the contract, as assigned in
writing by the PCO." [Ref. 6:p. 2] This policy also limits
the PCO's ability to delegate contract administration tasks.
For instance,
... it is appropriate to task the COTR to review invoices to
ensure the general appropriateness of types and quantities
of labor and materials to the tasks being performed.
However, it is inappropriate to require the COTR to perform
a detailed review of invoices for mathematical accuracy,
compliance with contract cost principles, or similar
purposes. [Ref. 6:p. 3]
In other words, anything the PCO might ever need the COTR to
do within the bounds of technical guidance and certain
restricted administrative tasking needs to be delineated in
the CAP, the COTR appointment letter and the contract.
27
Once all of the responsibilities are defined, the
PCO can determine if additional assistance is needed above
and beyond the COTR from the requiring activity. The SECNAV
COTR instruction alludes to this:
When the administrative burden of the contract is signifi-
cant, as is typically the case if numerous orders will be
placed, it may be appropriate to explore with the cognizant
technical manager the availability of administrative
resources to support the COTR. [Ref. 6:p. 4]
In addition to constraining the duties the COTR
can perform, both policies dictate that there are certain
areas in which he is forbidden to act. Specific regulatory
statements point out that COTRs have no authority to:
... take any action, either directly or indirectly, that
could change the pricing/cost or fee, quantity, quality,
scope, delivery schedule, labor mix or other terms and
conditions of the contract and/or delivery order. [Ref.
7:p. 2]
A COTR is not an ordering officer and should exercise care in
providing guidance so that his direction does not lead to
unauthorized commitments.
The duties of a COTR cannot be delegated;
however, alternate COTRs may be assigned. Selection criteria
are the same for the alternates as for the regular COTRs. In
general, only one COTR is appointed per contract to facili-
tate having a single liaison point. Exceptions to this
requirement are service contracts for activities with
widespread locations which would require excessive travel
between locations if only one COTR is assigned. [Ref. 7:p.
3]
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While not addressed in the SECNAV nor NAVSUP
guidance, the Naval Regional Contracting Center (NRCC), San
Diego, California, makes provisions in its COTR instruction
(NRCCSDINST 4205.7) for a COTR assistant called the Navy
Technical Representative (NTR). When the scope of an IDTC
requires delivery orders be written across a range of
technical areas too broad for one individual's technical
expertise, the requiring activity may assign a NTR to provide
assistance to the COTR. Though this individual assists the
COTR by performing inspection and monitoring duties, the COTR
is still the single point of contact between the contractor
and PCO with reference to technical matters. In addition,
... the COTR remains technically responsible for contractor
performance monitoring despite the assignment of NTRs.
Therefore, the COTR should ensure input received from the
NTRs is accurate and appropriate to the scope of the
contract and delivery order. [Ref. 8:p. 5]
Before NTRs can be assigned, they must have completed NAVSUP-
approved COTR training [Ref. 8:p. 4]. Appendix H provides a
sample NTR assignment letter which lists in more detail the
duties that can be assigned to NTRs.
2. Procedures
a. Nomination of the COTR
Once it is determined that a contract requires a
COTR, then the commanding officer (or his delegate) of the
customer activity must submit a COTR nomination letter to the
PCO of the contracting activity. This letter introduces the
prospective COTR to the PCO. It cites the COTR's technical
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qualifications and lays out the basic technical functions the
COTR will be expected to perform. While the SECNAV instruc-
tions require that the COTR be trained prior to appointment,
the NAVSUP instruction requires that a statement citing the
completion date of NAVSUP-approved COTR training be made in
the nomination letter. Both instructions state that
performance rating elements should include the pertinent
technical and administrative areas related to COTR functions
for those individuals assigned as COTRs; however, only the
NAVSUP instruction requires that this be addressed in the
nomination letter. In addition, if COTR duties are not given
consideration in performance appraisals, NAVSUP requires a
statement as to the reason. A sample COTR nomination letter
is contained in Appendix I.
b. Appointment of the COTR
After the nominee is deemed qualified by the PCO,
the PCO formally appoints him in writing as the COTR. The
appointment letter specifies the duties the COTR is expected
to perform for that particular IDTC. Special reporting
procedures and any other particular requirements pertaining
to the specific contract are cited in the letter. The COTR
then provides technical guidance and monitors service
contract performance on the location at which the contractor
performs. The COTR appointed for the IDTC is the COTR for
all subsequent delivery orders against it. A sample appoint-
ment letter is located in Appendix J. [Ref. 7:p. 3]
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When a COTR is appointed, the PCO must notify the
contractor through a contract provision. A copy of this
provision is in Appendix K. (Ref. 7:p. 4]
c. Monitoring of the COTR
The PCO is charged with oversight responsibility
for all COTRs under his purview. He must maintain a list of
all active COTRs and their alternates. This list should
cross-reference the contracts under which the COTRs are
appointed. Periodic reviews must be made by the PCOs to
ensure their COTRs are performing in a satisfactory manner.
The SECNAVINST 4200.27 requires that the PCOs
conduct a file and performance review of approximately one-
third of their COTRs once a year as a minimum. It further
specifies that "this review function may be assigned to the
cognizant procuring activity's procurement management review
(PMR) organization" (Ref. 6:p. 3].
The NAVSUPINST 4205.3 follows the SECNAV instruc-
tion with regard to file maintenance, but takes exception to
the assignment of the review function to a PMR organization:
These monitoring requirements, including review of COTRs'
files and performance is the responsibility of the PCO/
procuring activity. Within the NFCS this function shall
not be assigned to a procurement management review
organization which is not within the same activity. [Ref.
7:pp. 3-4]
The West Coast interpretation of this direction is that COTR
performance reviews are conducted on an annual basis by the
PCOs. Compliance reviews, on the other hand, are conducted
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by the procurement activities from which the NFCS activities
derive their procurement authority. For example, the
Regional Procurement Management (RPM) Department of Naval
Regional Contracting Center (NRCC) San Diego, California
conducts COTR Performance Reviews in conjunction with an
established three-year PMR cycle for activities which receive
procurement authority from NRCC San Diego to determine if the
PCOs at these activities are conducting annual reviews of
their COTRs. [Ref. 8:p. 3]
d. Coordination of the COTR
Although the PCO performs solely under the
auspices of the NAVSUP, the COTR assigned in the contract
performs assignment responsibilities both for his own
requiring activity and for the PCO.
The SECNAVINST 4200.27 recommends:
... it is appropriate for the PCO and the requiring activity
technical director or Commander to schedule periodic
meetings to ensure prompt and coordinated resolution of any
problems which arise in contract performance. [Ref. 6:pp.
3-4]
The NAVSUP instruction provides more stringent
direction with regard to how often the meetings should occur:
The frequency of these meetings (i.e., quarterly, monthly,
etc.) will depend upon the number and size of contracts
involved, however, they shall as a minimum be conducted on
a quarterly basis .... The purpose of such regular meetings
is to ensure that the Commander/Commanding Officer and/or
Technical Director is adequately informed about the con-
tracts involved, to maintain essential dialogue between the
contracting office and requiring activity COTRs, and ensure
that COTR functions are consistently applied. [Ref. 7:p.
4]
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The responsibilities of the COTR require him to
have a foot in several camps. He must liaison with the
contractor, but maintain an arms-length relationship. He
must work with the ordering officer, but maintain an adequate
separation of functional responsibilities. He must satisfy
the demands of hiz supervisor while monitoring contractor
performance for the PCO.
E. SUMMARY
This chapter has discussed the service contract environ-
ment in which the COTR works. It has addressed the impor-
tance of how a well-defined SOW can make the job of the PCO,
COTR, customer and contractor much easier to carry out.
Special attention has been paid to the advantages and
disadvantages of the three forms of an IDTC. The reader is
now aware of the policies and procedures which the PCO, the
ordering officer, and the COTR must follow. The manner in
which their roles interface with each other and the
contractor has been highlighted.
Chapter III will analyze specific COTR-related deficien-
cies found during West Coast NFCS PMRs over the past two and
a half years. The finding, its reference and an analysis
will be provided.
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III. ANALYSIS OF PROCUREMENT MANAGEMENT REVIEW FINDINGS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter analyzes data extracted from Procurement
Management Reviews (PMRs) of West Coast Navy Field Contract-
ing System (NFCS) activities conducted during fiscal years
1988, 1989 and the first quarter of 1990. Because of their
ease of access and uniform review procedures, the _ise of
these PMRs facilitated the identification of common findings
related to the administration of Indefinite Delivery Type
Contracts (IDTCs) by Contracting Officer's Technical
Representatives (COTRs).
Of the over 190 NFCS activities on the West Coast,
approximately 168 had PMRs conducted within the years
analyzed in this thesis. Of these 168 activities, approxi-
mately 23 utilized or had oversight responsibilities for
IDTCs of the type which require the use of COTRs. A total of
86 deficiencies related to IDTC/COTR administration of Type
II delivery orders was contained in 20 of the 23 PMRs
analyzed.
The number of COTRs employed by these activities ranged
from one to over 50. A separate breakdown of Type II
delivery orders statistics was indeterminable from the data
compiled for this analysis; however, the combined number of
Type I and Type II delivery orders placed against IDTCs per
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year per activity ranged from one to over 2650 with a mean of
672 delivery orders per year per activity. The total dollar
value attributable to delivery orders placed under IDTCs
(Type I delivery orders included) ranged from $9539 to
$9,278,000 with the average NFCS activity exceeding $2.84
million per year with a mean of approximately $4227 per
delivery order. The substantial number of outliers prevented
any meaningful correlation analysis; however, these numbers
do signify the dramatic diversity and vast range of funds
expended under IDTCs by NFCS activities.
B. ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
Procurement Management Reviews follow two formats
depending on level of purchase/contracting authority:
1. PMR Report Format for an Activity with More Than
$25,000 ContractinQ Authority
* Chapter I--Mission and Organization
* Chapter II--Policies and Procedures
* Chapter III--Planning
* Chapter IV--Contracting, Solicitation and Selection
Procedures
* Chapter V--Pricing
* Chapter VI--Post Award Functions
* Chapter VII--Small Purchases
* Chapter VIII--Management of Contracting Function.
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2. PMR Report Format for an Activity with $25,000 or
Less Contracting Authority
* Chapter I--Mission and Organization
* Chapter II--Scope of Review
* Chapter III--Management Support and Control
* Chapter IV--Requirements Discipline
* Chapter V--Pricing Considerations
* Chapter VI--Competition
* Chapter VII--Contracting Administration
* Chapter VIII--Procedural Aspects of Small Purchase
Methods.
Table 2 segregates PMR chapters that contain COTR-
related findings into two categories--greater than $25,000
and $25,000 or less. Within each procurement category, the
table further segregates findings into their respective PMR
chapters.
Some findings are redundant because they appear in
both categories. While there is some overlap between the two
procurement categories, redundant findings have been combined
into specific chapters in order to discuss and analyze each
one. Although some of the PMR chapters appear to be outside
the scope of contract administration, they are addressed
because they often have ramifications which roll over into
IDTC/COTR management.
Each finding will be discussed, followed by its
reference and an analysis by the author. Analyses are
formulated from a consensus of readings, PMR comments,
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TABLE 2
PMR CHAPTERS THAT CONTAIN COTR ISSUES
PMR CHAPTERS THAT CONTAIN COTR ISSUES
ACTIVITIES WITH > $25,000 AUTHORITY FINDINGS
CH II : POLICIES & PROCEDURES I
CH 111: PLANNING 2
CH IV: CONTRACTING, SOLICITA-
TION & SELECTION PROCEDURES 1
CH V: PRICING 4
CH VI: POST AWARD FUNCTIONS 7
ACTIVITIES WITH < $25,000 AUTHORITY FINDINGS
CH I: MISSION & ORGANIZATION 1
CH III: MANAGEMENT SUPPORT &
CONTROL 6
CH V: PRICING CONSIDERATIONS 4
CH VII: CONTRACTING ADMINIS-
TRATION 6
interviews and discussions with contracting personnel,
inspectors and managers associated with the administration of
IDTCs and COTR management; therefore, specific references to
interviews are used only when the viewpoint is not shared by
the comments of other interviewees.
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C. SPECIFIC FINDINGS
The following paragraphs will analyze each PMR finding in
the order presented in Table 2. Findings from activities
with more than $25,000 contracting authority are analyzed
first, followed by those identified in PMRs at activities
with $25,000 or less procurement authority.
1. Activities with More than $25,000 Contracting
Authority
For the two contracting activities deriving their
procurement authority (greater than $25,000) from the Naval
Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP), findings were taken from
Chapters II, III, IV, V and VI of the PMR. These findings
are oriented primarily around the management of IDTCs and
monitoring of COTRs from a procuring contracting officer
(PCO) standpoint. A total of 15 findings were determined as
significant because they were deficiencies common to both
activities and/or were judged by the author to be critical to
IDTC/COTR management.
a. Policies and Procedures
Table 2 delineates one significant finding in
this area. Deficiencies coming from this PMR chapter are the
result of inadequacies in contracting instructions and
outdated procedures pertaining to contracting officer
appointments, contract review boards, legal review,
preparation and control of internal and external (DD 350 and
DD 1057) reports, timely distribution of contracts and
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modifications, and file documentation [Ref. 10:p. 12]. The
finding is set forth in the following paragraph.
Finding: Inappropriate Contract Distribution
Reference: FAR 4.201(f) requires that
contracting officers "provide copies of the contracts and
modifications to those organizations required to perform
contract administration support functions." [Ref. 3]
Analysis: Activities did not always comply with
this regulation and appropriately distribute IDTCs. For
IDTCs, COTRs and Ordering Officers need to have a copy of the
contract to place orders and perform other contract adminis-
tration functions. Most reviewers queried about this
discrepancy stated that it occurs most often as a result of
administrative oversight.
b. Planning
Two significant findings from this area are
exhibited in Table 2. This chapter reviews the propriety of
contract administration plans (CAPs), year-end spending,
leadtime constraints, adequacy of contract requests
(including specifications and statements of work (SOWs)),
demand reporting, competition and sole source justifications,
the Trade Agreements Act, quality control/inspection, value
engineering, and non-personal services justifications [Ref.
10:pp. 12-13]. The deficient areas are discussed below.
(1) Finding One. Failure to Incorporate a
Contract Administration Plan (CAP) into the Service Contract
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Reference: NAVSUPINST 4330.7 Service
Contract Administration provides guidance and procedures for
the development of Contract Administration Plans (CAPs) to
ensure satisfactory administration of service contracts. A
CAP is required to be prepared and incorporated in all
service IDTCs that employ COTRs. [Ref. 4:p. 3]
Analysis: Procuring activities must ensure
that requiring activity projections accurately reflect the
support required in the CAP before contract award is made.
Many service contract files failed to include a CAP. The
failure to incorporate CAPs in service contracts can be the
result of poor documentation or a disregard for regulation
compliance. This pre-award documentation deficiency leads to
post-award contract administration problems.
(2) Finding Two. Inadequate Advanced Planning
Reference: SECNAVINST 4205.5 states "it is
appropriate for the PCO and requiring activity... to schedule
periodic meetings to ensure prompt and coordinated resolution
of any problems ...." [Ref. 6:p. 3]
Analysis: Inadequate advanced planning is
caused by a lack of communication between the procuring
activity and the requiring activity. The establishment of a
CAP does not guarantee that the contractual support provided
will always be adequate to support the requiring activity's
service requirements. For example, one PMR discrepancy cited
that a predominance of the procuring activity's
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Justifications and Approvals (J&As) for sole source procure-
ments (approved by NAVSUP) were done to "bridge" current
IDTCs because the requiring activity expended the level of
effort set forth in the current contract at a rate that was
faster than anticipated and before performance was completed.
When J&As have to be issued continually for additional hours
and increases of funds before a competitive follow-on
contract is awarded, it becomes apparent that continued
communication and planning updates are necessary. While
"bridges" are sometimes needed to accommodate changing
customer requirements, procuring activities must be vigilant
to monitor performance patterns which may indicate systemic
abuses and indicate poor planning between the requiring
activity and the contracting activity.
c. Contracting, Solicitation and Selection
Procedures
Table 2 identifies one significant finding
generated from an analysis of this PMR chapter. The area of
review consists of the effectiveness of sealed bidding
procedures; effectiveness of negotiated acquisitions to
include the extent of competition, effectiveness of price
competition, competitive range decisions, discussions with
offerors, and best and final offers; adequacy of sole source
justifications; steps hping taken to foster competition,
Competition Advocacy Program; the solicitation process
including source identification and bid room security; and
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determining contractor responsibility [Ref. 10:p. 13]. The
deficient area is analyzed below.
Finding: Unsubstantiated Technical Evaluations
in Source Selection Process
Reference: FAR 15.608(a) (2) states source
selection technical evaluations must substantiate a basis for
evaluation and include a summary of findings [Ref. 3].
Analysis: When the technical evaluations per-
formed and accepted by the Contracting Officer do not include
a detailed narrative summary and findings to support their
rating or ranking, the COTR can be given a contract to
administer that is technically unacceptable.
d. Pricing
Table 2 lists four significant findings. The PMR
chapter on pricing evaluates the organization of the pricing
function--personnel and training; Request for Proposal (RFP)
pricing provisions including cost proposal requirements;
Public Law 87-653 clauses, Cost Accounting Standards (CAS)
clauses, Service Contract wage provisions, etc.; price
analysis, the reasonableness of prices paid and the pricing
determinations. Cost analysis is also reviewed and includes
adequacy of contractor cost proposals, technical and audit
assistance and the timeliness of field pricing assistance;
developing and documenting negotiation objectives, prenego-
tiation memorandum, certificate of current cost and pricing
data, audit resolution, and timeliness of clearance
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approvals. In addition, the assessment of pricing at the
procuring activity also includes the type of contract and
pricing arrangements such as Firm Fixed-Price, Cost, and
Incentive-type contracts [Ref. 10:pp. 13-14] Deficient areas
found are discussed in the following paragraphs.
(1) FindinQ One. Delivery Orders Issued Without
Contractor Quotes
Reference: PMRs emphasized that there is no
regulatory authority for issuing orders under IDTCs without
requesting a quotation from the contractor.
Analysis: Several delivery orders at one
activity did not contain quotes nor indicate quotations were
requested from contractors before issued. The orders were
written as Not-To-Exceed orders under Time and Materials/
Labor Hour-type contracts. Ceiling prices were obtained from
lump sum estimates provided by the requiring activities.
Another contractor's hourly labor rates were used for the
price analysis instead of a comparison between the Government
estimate and contractor's proposal. The total number of
hours, labor categories, material, and travel costs were not
analyzed.
Several issues are at play in this example.
First, under a Time and Materials contract, the hours used
are directly proportional to the contractor's profit. There-
fore, the Government must try to incentivize low cost
performance throughout the whole procurement process.
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Second, the hours and material/travel costs were not
negotiated in advance. Interviews led to the conclusion that
this is not a wide-scale problem, but it is important enough
to warrant comment in this section.
(2) Finding Two. Delivery Orders Issued Without
Detailed Independent Government Estimates (IGEs)
Reference: FAR 15.803(b) states: "the
contracting officer shall.. .develop an estimate of the proper
price level or value of the supplies or services to be
purchased." (Ref. 3]
Analysis: One PMR asserted that a requiring
activity failed to provide a definitive statement of work and
an IGE for each of its requisitions for services over
$25,000. Many files reviewed did not contain adequate IGEs.
The use of a comprehensive Government estimate for all
delivery orders assists both the COTR and PCO in the break-
down, evaluation and questioning of contractor estimates for
material, labor, travel and per diem. The reason this
estimate must be independent is because it serves as a
realistic and meaningful benchmark which PCOs may use to
determine price reasonableness. Without a comparison against
which contractor costs can be evaluated, the PCO's rationale
for the determination of price reasonableness becomes ques-
tionable. Increased costs to the Government can result from
faulty IGEs because contractors usually expend all of the
effort allowed under the delivery order. Discussions with
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inspectors noted that the main problems in this area are a
function of administrative laxity and time constraints. Most
files contain IGEs, but they are not fully documented.
(3) FindinQ Three. Inadequate Procedures for
the Establishment of Fair and Reasonable Prices
Reference: FAR 15.803(c) states: "the
contracting officer is responsible for exercising the
requisite judgment and is solely responsible for the final
pricing decision." [Ref. 3]
Analysis: When delivery orders are
processed by the PCO at the procuring activity, the PCO is
then responsible for soliciting the proposal, performing cost
or price analysis, negotiating questionable costs, and making
a supportable determination of price reasonableness. A host
of specialists are available to assist him if he is uncomfor-
table with any of the costs or technical aspects of the
delivery order. While the PCO is ultimately responsible for
the determination of a fair and reasonable price, the COTR is
frequently one of the individuals most technically qualified
to evaluate the variance in estimated versus proposed cost
proposals. The COTR's assistance should be relied on to
review proposals for appropriateness of types and quantities
of labor and materials.
Many of the delivery order file:s reviewed at
one activity did not contain an analysis of proposed
material/travel costs versus those estimated by the
45
Government. In another activity the difference between labor
hours/categories estimated and those proposed was quite
notable, but there was no evidence to support the variance.
Moreover, when documentation existed, it lacked a sufficient
basis for justification. Several delivery ordcrs issued by
the contracting activity lacked a signature by the PCO on the
negotiation memorandum. Interviews indicated that these
kinds of discrepancies most often occur when the PCO is
rushed and fails to properly document the delivery order
file. Some COTRs stated that they are seldom consulted by
the PCO for technical analysis.
(4) Finding Four. Unauthorized Commitments by
the COTR
Reference: NAVSUPINST 4330.7 states: "only
the PCO, ACO or Ordering Officer shall have the authority to
request proposals, negotiate prices and obligate the
Government." [Ref. 4:p. 6]
Analysis: Pricing problems also occur when
COTRs overstep their authority. Two examples are provided.
The first illustrates how COTRs are sometimes over-zealous in
their efforts to get delivery orders placed. The second
demonstrates how administration laxity can lead to wanton
Government waste.
The COTR at one activity solicited quotes,
held discussions with contractors, signed unsubstantiated
"negotiation memos" containing no supportable determination
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of price reasonableness, typed the delivery order and then
passed it to the procuring activity's PCO who signed it
without a determination of price reasonableness.
In the second example, the requiring
activity's COTR appeared to have predetermined the hours and
other costs with contractor representatives prior to the sub-
mission of the request to the PCO. When the PCO received
what was claimed to be an IGE from the COTR it was found to
be an almost identical match to the contractor's proposal.
No price analysis or determination of reasonableness occurred
and the contractor was allowed to perform at no risk within
his "negotiated" ceiling price.
e. Post-Award Functions
Seven significant findings are displayed in Table
2. The review of the Post-Award Functions is comprised of
monitoring progress of contracts after award for adherence to
delivery schedules, consideration for delays, default
actions; Government Furnished Property (GFP/GFE); quality
assurance (QA) and inspection requirements, monitoring first
article acceptance; value engineering change proposals;
contract closure; claims and the administration of service
contracts to include ordering officer and COTR appointments,
issuance of orders, monitoring minimum and maximum contract
amounts, PCO feedback, monitoring performance and certifica-
tion of invoices [Ref. 10:pp. 14-15]. The findings below
examine post-award discrepancies.
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(1) Finding One. Noncompliance with Contract
Administration Plans (CAPs)
Reference: NAVSUPINST 4330.7 specifies
activity responsibilities pertaining to the CAP to "ensure
satisfactory administration of service contracts and avoid
duplication of functions." [Ref. 4:p. 2)
Analysis: A previous finding discussed the
absence of CAPs for service contracts. This finding looks
into the inadequacies involving the actual compliance with
the CAPs that were established.
Delivery order files at several activities
showed back-up data submitted to support the Ordering
Officer's position were inadequate, most notably in the area
of negotiation memoranda. This deficiency was noted in many
of the service IDTCs reviewed.
In addition, the NAVSUPINST 4330.7 requires
that the currency of the CAPs be monitored and maintained by
the PCO throughout the life of the contract. [Ref. 4:p. 5]
This may be done by an annual review of the CAP concurrent
with exercise of the option, or by documented review at any
time during the life of the contract. At the activities
reviewed, there was little indication in the files examined
that consideration of the currency of the CAP was made.
Interviews reflected that this finding is a
function of personnel shortages, time constraints, and
administrative laxity.
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(2) Finding Two. Inadequate Monitoring of
Service Contracts
Reference: NAVSUPINST 4205.3 states:
To provide an adequate basis for the COTR to monitor
contract performance, the PCO shall include a requirement
...for a status report to be delivered on a monthly basis
(from the contractor). [Ref. 7:p. 4]
Analysis: The PCO, Ordering Officer, and
COTR are required to monitor IDTCs. The monitoring of these
service contracts includes the tracking of: funds obligated,
labor hours expended, average hourly rates incurred, total
cost incurred, and accomplishments to date. This monitoring
is necessary to ensure contract ceilings are not exceeded and
that labor mixes are appropriate for services received. In
addition, diligent monitoring helps identify fraudulent
actions. One of the primary tools used to conduct this
monitoring is the contractor's status report.
The PMRs exposed deficiencies in the
monitoring of IDTCs. The PCOs', ordering officers' and
COTRs' failure to monitor contractor progress reports contri-
buted heavily to this discrepancy. Activities in many cases
did not include the requirement for status reports in the
basic IDTC. This lack of compliance with the regulation is
caused by administrative laxity and lack of knowledge by
procuring activity personnel. It results in the Government's
loss of control over the IDTC. It can also result in
problems with invoking termination for default rights. For
49
example, contractor performance at one activity was inade-
quate and resulted in a rejection at time of inspection.
File documentation reflected that the contractor was
delinquent in correction efforts and the due date for receipt
of corrected material was past with no indication of whether
acceptable material was delivered. In this case, untimely
contractor monitoring was responsible for the Government
waiving its right to a termination for default.
One PMR stated that IDTC service contracts
were poorly administered because supervisors did not assign
actions to administrators based on grade level and complex-
ity. Besides highlighting the impact management deficiencies
can have on IDTCs, this finding demonstrates the need for
communication and training among PCOs, ordering officers and
COTRs.
(3) Finding Three. Inadequate Control Over
Requiring Activities
Reference: NAVSUP Publication 570 states:
"PCO's are cautioned that they remain ultimately accountable
for the actions taken by authorized ordering activities under
the PCO's contract(s)." [Ref. l:p. 10]
Analysis: Procuring activities examined
were not exercising sufficient control over requiring
activity ordering officers and COTRs in many cases. Reviews
of delivery order files at activities indicated many
reoccurring deficiencies which had not been corrected by the
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PCO. Several of the deficiencies found in the PMRs are
listed below.
Contractor's complete cost estimate (proprietary cost
information) was made a part of the delivery order in
violation of the Privacy Act and the Freedom of
Information Act.
Delivery orders incorrectly assigned COTR functions to
activities and individuals other than those specified in
the IDTC and CAP.
Delivery orders were issued outside the scope of work of
the basic contract.
Delivery orders were issued outside the scope of work of
the basic contract requiring Organizational Conflict of
Interest (OCI) provisions which were not included in the
original IDTC. The delivery orders issued required the
design contractor to review and approve/disapprove a
contractor's request for contract deviations. The
delivery orders were out of scope as: (1) the contract
did not include OCI provisions to protect the Government
and ensure impartiality on the part of the design
contractor; (2) the statement of work did not allow for
services of this type; and (3) the task required the
contractor to perform an inherently Government function.
Delivery orders with annual appropriations for services
were issued for a more than one-year period. The IDTCs
were for a one-year period with options for additional
one-year periods, allowing a typical 30-day period for
contractor to complete tasks commenced during the
ordering period. Issuing delivery orders which required
performance for more than 30 days after the expiration
of the contract (option year) created unauthorized
contractual commitment
These discrepancies display an "out of
sight, out of mind" mentality which plagues the contract
administration function. It reinforces the need for PCOs to
conduct ordering officer reviews to ensure that delivery
orders are placed in accordance with the terms of the
contract and the contract administration plan. They also
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show a need for ordering officer and COTR training. Ordering
officers interviewed indicated that the cause of many of
these discrepancies is misinterpretation of regulations and
an inability to get in contact with the PCO to clarify
issues. Procuring activities blame personnel shortages, time
constraints, and the excessive number of production-oriented
contract actions they must perform for their inability to
control requiring activities.
(4) Finding Four. Deficient Procedures For
Exercise of Options
Reference: FAR 17.207 requires that prior
to exercise of an extension option, the PCO must ascertain
that funds are (or are reasonably expected to become) avail-
able; that the requirement satisfies an existing Government
need; that exercise of the option is the most advantageous
means of satisfying the requirement; and that unless the
option was addressed in the synopsis of the original
solicitation, exercising the option has been synopsized. The
FAR also requires that the contractor be provided with
written notice of the Government's intent to exercise the
option. [Ref. 3)
Analysis: An option is described in FAR
Part 17 as a unilateral right in an IDTC which allows the
Government to purchase additional services for a given time
or to extend the contract's period of performance [Ref. 3].
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One activity's analyses to support the
exercise of options were deficient because they failed to
address all the factors mentioned in the above reference. In
some contract files, the analyses were missing entirely. The
PMR found that prior to the exercise of an option the PCO
failed to ascertain whether or not the requirement would
continue as set forth in the option. Failure to obtain and
review the annual COTR report on the contractor's performance
as required by NAVSUPINST 4205.3 contributed to this problem.
Furthermore, findings showed that PCOs often did not review
service requirements prior to the exercise of options nor
make determinations that the services were nonpersonal in
nature. Reviews also showed that contractors did not receive
proper notices of the Government's intent to exercise an
option. Likewise, PCOs failed to conduct proper negotiations
and obtain new wage determinations from the Department of
Labor.
The procuring activity must ensure that
COTRs submit the mandatory annual report of the contractor's
performance, and that this report is used in the documenta-
tion to show a Government need still exists. Option abuses
were blamed on a lack of understanding by ordering officers,
lack of compliance by COTRs, and a lack of proper monitoring
of the requiring activity by the PCO.
(5) FindinQ Five. Failure to Identify Govern-
ment Furnished Property (GFP)
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Reference: FAR Part 45 requires that PCOs
identify GFP furnished to contractors including the estimated
value of the GFP, and appoint a property administrator.
[Ref. 3]
Analysis: Ideally, GFP should be identified
(including estimated value of the GFP) in solicitations, con-
tracts and delivery orders where GFP is furnished to contrac-
tors. Findings in PMRs indicate that this is not always the
case. Conversations with NFCS personnel communicated that
the reason for this discrepancy is largely due to changes in
the SOW that add GFP, but then the modification to the IDTC
never gets documented. Administrative oversight also leads
to the failure to appoint Government property administrators.
The NAVSUPINST 4330.7 implies COTRs are responsible to the
PCO for GFP. Of the several COTRs interviewed, most stated
that they relied heavily on the property administrator for
procedural compliance.
(6) Finding Six. Failure to Select Proper
Contract Type
Reference: FAR 16 specifies contract types,
their description, application and limitations. [Ref. 3]
Analysis: Activities occasionally selected
the wrong contract type for the task to be accomplished.
Examples included delivery orders which used Cost-Plus-Award-
Fee contracts in situations in which Time and Materials/Labor
Hour or Completion-type tasks were more appropriate. This
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discrepancy indicates the need for a better understanding of
contract applications and limitations by PCOs and ordering
officers.
(7) Finding Seven. Failure to Administer
Delivery Orders Properly
Reference: FAR 16.506(d) (4) specifies that
delivery orders under IDTCs shall contain the delivery or
performance date [Ref. 3].
Analysis: At one activity, indefinite
delivery orders were placed specifying a period of several
months vice a specific date. This made it impossible to
determine when the service was to be performed. In another
example, under a Time and Materials Contract, delivery orders
were issued as Not-to-Exceed (NTE) lump sum orders without
any estimated number of hours. References to line items from
the contract and material cost/travel costs were not itemized
on the purchase request or resultant delivery order.
2. Activities with $25,000 or less Contracting Authority
Findings were primarily taken from Chapters I, III V
and VII of PMRs conducted by NRCC San Diego at the 18
contracting activities deriving their procurement authority
($25,000 or less) from the NRCC. These findings are oriented
chiefly around COTR procedures and the contract administra-
tion of delivery orders from a requiring activity standpoint.
For the purpose of this study, findings in this category are
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limited to discrepancies found in four or more of the 18
PMRs.
a. Mission and Organization
Table 2 indicates that one finding from this PMR
chapter was determined to be significant. The PMR chapter
reviews the adequacy of mission and organization; assigned
contracting authority; and organizational structure of
contracting activity.
FindinQ: Insufficient Organizational Structure
of the Contracting Activity
Reference: None Cited
Analysis: While this discrepancy appears on the
s.rface as an overly-generalized catch-all finding which has
many offshoots, the specific organizational structure of the
requiring activity merits more than a "motherhood" comment.
The issue of the organizational network must be addressed as
an entity in itself because it represents the environment
with which the COTR must interact to perform his
administrative duties. Many of the deficiencies noted in
this finding will be discussed in more detail under other
chapters, but this finding illustrates what a pervasive
impact one finding, such as an ineffective organizational
structure, can have across the entire spectrum of contracting
at a requiring activity. Interviews with inspectors
indicated that this discrepancy is primarily caused by three
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factors: (1) lack of functional control; (2) resistance to
change; and (3) personnel shortages.
The lack of effective functional control over
contracting at the requiring activity fosters a more quasi-
clerical procurement function and leaves an organization more
vulnerable to the squandering of resources and potentially
abusive practices. This lack of effective managerial control
often finds its roots in apathy and low priority management
attention. Interviews with COTRs revealed that while most
COTRs feel their job is necessary and important, some stated
that they do not feel their administrative efforts are ade-
quately represented nor supported in mission-oriented manage-
ment structures. For example, one individual received notice
shortly before a PMR that he was the COTR because the
previous COTR had transferred without having his duties
reassigned. The organizational structure permitted this to
occur and resulted in poor managerial attention because the
COTR duty was not deemed mission essential. No oversight
considerations were given for proper training, nomination,
appointment, nor contract documentation pass down.
It was noted that realignment efforts required to
bring an activity under more centralized or functional
control frequently encounter resistance. Even though
commands may be committed to organizational changes on paper,
resistance to putting these "official" changes into actual
use seriously undermines the requiring activity's ability to
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benefit from the more effective controls and oversight of a
more centralized organizational structure. One activity took
no action to correct any of the PMR contract administration
discrepancies. No evidence of the execution of corrective
actions was observed during a follow-up review. All matters
pertaining to the administration of the contracts continued
to be accomplished by personnel other than the Ordering
Officer and COTR. No organizational structures were in place
at the requiring activity to ensure adequate oversight and a
clear game plan for executing administrative duties assigned
under the IDTCs. Liaison between the Ordering Officer, COTRs
and PCOs was nonexistent.
In addition to the concerns with the overall
functional organization, personnel shortages impact staffing
and the alignment of responsibilities. One PMR described
this problem in the following:
The current branch supervisor is inordinately tasked to
personally ensure (COTR) functions are executed for the
(IDTC). This is a virtually impossible task in conjunction
with other extensive supervisory functions for the
considerable number of significant contracting actions in-
house under this individual's supervision.
Mission and organizational aspects with regard to
the administration of IDTCs by the COTR work force set the
stage for the further analysis of more specific PMR findings.
b. Management Support and Control
Table 2 shows six significant findings were iden-
tified from this area of review. The PMR chapter on
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Management Support and Control evaluates correction of prior
PMR findings; adequacy of staffing; training; management
information; customer responsiveness in the support area and
adequacy of purchase description; separation of functions and
other safeguards against fraud; misapplication of contracting
authority; and selection of purchase methods in the
management area.
(1) Finding One. COTR Nomination/Appointment/
Assignment Deficiencies
Reference: NAVSUPINST 4205.3 requires the
COTR to be nominated in writing by the requiring activity
commanding officer or designee. The PCO shall formally
appoint the COTR by a letter tailored to fit the specific
contract involved. The COTR must be technically knowledge-
able, trained, and hold a position commensurate with the
complexity of the contract. Duties are not redelegable.
[Ref. 7:pp. 2-3]
Analysis: PMRs revealed many individuals
were functioning as COTRs under current contracts, but had
not been nominated and duly appointed as required by the
above reference. At one activity, the Commanding Officer
directly issued the COTR appointment letter instead of
sending a nomination letter to the PCO. Another activity
assigned an individual as the COTR, yet the appointment
letter from the PCO indicated a different individual as the
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COTR. Activities must ensure that each basic contract
clearly cites the correct individual as the COTR. Several
COTRs indicated that efforts to modify contracts with updated
COTR assignments had not been successful. Still, before an
individual can act as a COTR, he must be appointed by the PCO
in the contract and if that person changes, the contract must
be modified to reflect this administrative change.
It is the responsibility of the requiring
activity to ensure individuals within their command are in
full compliance with all regulatory mandates prior to
executing assigned duties. This discrepancy was one of the
most common among the 18 activities reviewed. While it may
only seem as a minor documentation oversight, this discrepan-
cy is particularly noteworthy because the official appoint-
ment is meant to serve as the vehicle through which COTR
duties are clearly delineated and to ensure appointments are
predicated upon current training and qualifications.
An area of interpretation surfaced in one
PMR. Paragraph 5f of the reference specifically prohibits
more than one COTR on the same contract. Conversely,
paragraph 5d requires the COTR to have extensive technical
expertise in the area of performance of services and also to
hold a position with a level of responsibility commensurate
with the complexity/technical requirements of the contract.
In two mentioned cases the activity could not fully comply.
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One contract used by the activity had three widely separate
geographical areas of performance. The activity had three
COTRs monitoring performance for those locations. One COTR
could not possibly effectively monitor contractor performance
at all three sites. In the other case, an engineering
services contract was used by three technical branches at the
activity with distinctly different areas of technical cogni-
zance. One of the branch heads was designated as the sole
COTR for the contract. This complied with the requirements
of paragraph 5d for orders placed in support of the one
branch; however, this individual did not have the technical
expertise or the necessary vested interest in requirements
generated by the other branches. Policy guidance was
requested from Naval Supply Systems Command for this issue.
A waiver was subsequently granted.
Another PMR discovered a budget and finan-
cial specialist as the COTR for engineering, technical and
support services, as well as test and evaluation of airborne
weapon systems. While the COTR maintained adequate adminis-
trative control, he was completely dependent upon task
managers for technical oversight. As the PCO's primary point
of contact for the technical matters, the COTR must be tech-
nically qualified to oversee all technical issues during the
life of the contract.
(2) Findinq Two. Position Description
Deficiencies
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Reference: SECNAVINST 4205.5 states, "COTR
performance should be considered in rating the individual
assigned COTR functions, and PCO input should be requested."
Analysis: COTR duties were not included in
the position description of some of the COTRs assigned at
requiring activities. In addition, the COTR function was not
included as an evaluation element in the performance
appraisal for several COTRs.
Interviews with COTRs and reviewers indi-
cated COTRs spent 20 to 25 percent of their time performing
COTR-related duties. Their jobs merit comment. From a sub-
jective standpoint, the reason the COTR function is not
included as an evaluation element is that of requiring
activities to interpret the job as a duty being performed for
someone else. It is the opinion of this researcher that the
PCO should sell the role of the COTR to the requiring
activity's CO as a position which, if given support, will
prove to be in the requiring activity's own best interest.
(3) Finding Three. Ambiguous and Incomplete
Statements of Work (SOWs)
Reference: NAVSUP Publication 570 requires
that SOWs "are to define the Government's minimum, essential
needs and are to be as explicit as possible." [Ref. l:p. 3]
Analysis: A wide range of services that a
contractor can perform is normally incorporated in the
Statement of Work (SOW) for the basic IDTCs. Each IDTC
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specifies a general category of service as well as general
provisions related to performance. When a need arises at the
requiring activity, the ordering officer must review the
statement of work of the available contracts and decide which
contract, if any, can meet the need.
Many of the discrepancies cited in the PMRs
with regard to this finding were the result of administrative
shortcomings and misinterpretations of value specifications.
Statements on the delivery orders at some activities failed
to provide a list of GFP and thereby created a potential for
problems in the area of management and accountability of
equipment. In other cases the SOW in delivery orders was not
adequately definitive. General statements such as: "Provide
a wide range of detailed studies and reports ---"; "Periodi-
cally provide on site representation ...-"; and "Assist --- in
preparation for the semiannual planning conference" are not
definitive enough to provide a basis for any meaningful nego-
tiation of a ceiling price for the task. Another contention
to face with SOWs that are not definitized is that the resul-
tant requirement for frequent direction can be strongly
indicative of personal services.
One particular example disclosed a delivery
order placed against an IDTC for nonpersonal engineering
services which tasked a contractor with conducting an analy-
sis of Government labor and cost estimates and evaluating
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shipyard Job Estimates Sheets developed for repairs and ship
alterations (a service task).
FAR Subpart 37.2 defines advisory and
assistance services, as well as outlines the types available
and exclusions from use. It is important for the requiring
activity to review carefully all tasks to ensure that
performance properly falls within the purview of the basic
IDTC's statement of work.
(4) FindinQ Four. Inadequate Separation of
Functions
Reference: NAVSUPINST 4205.3 states that
the PCO should ensure there is adequate separation of func-
tions when appointing a COTR. [Ref. 7:p. 2]
Analysis: Reviews showed inadequate
separation of functions at several activities. One PMR
revealed that the individual assigned COTR duties under one
service contract was also functioning as an ordering officer.
This same individual was the supervisor over several ordering
officers under the same contract. None of these individuals
had received required NAVSUP training nor had they been
appropriately warranted to place orders under the contract.
The PCO failed in his responsibilities to perform in a compe-
tent manner by not checking on the COTR nominee prior to
appointment. Not very many activities were as blatant as the
above example and the problem can be traced to a lack of
training and ignorance of the regulations.
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(5) Finding Five. Improper Management Controls
Reference: NAVSUPINST 4205.3 addresses COTR
restrictions in the following:
...the COTR does not have the authority to take any action,
either directly or indirectly, that could change the
pricing/cost or fee... or other terms and conditions of the
contract and/or delivery order. [Ref. 7:p. 2]
Analysis: Misapplications of contracting
authority occur because improper management controls are
embodied within the contract. For example, one PMR revealed
a contract that stated no overtime would be authorized
without the prior approval of the Contracting Officer or
COTR. This was incorrect. The COTR is not authorized to
approve overtime. At the same activity, the contractor and
COTR constructively changed the contract requirement from
contractor-provided "posters and brochures" to "flyers and
business cards." There was no evidence in the file of PCO
approval or a modification to accomplish the change, as well
as evidence of a request for adequate or appropriate consid-
eration. In addition, there was no evidence in the file of
resumes showing qualifications of contractor personnel as
required by the purchase order for review by the COTR.
Errors and lack of management controls in
the basic IDTC multiply with delivery orders. The PMRs
offered many examples. Interviews with COTRs disclosed that
this discrepancy occurs when COTRs fail to communicate up
front with the contractor exactly what their position is so
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that the apparent authority issue gets remedied. It seems
that many of the discrepancies resulted from unintentional
actions.
(6) Finding Six. COTR Training Deficiencies
Reference: NRCCSDINST 4205.7 requires
successful completion of the NAVSUP-approved COTR training
and recommends the course be taken every three years to
ensure currency [Ref. 8:p. 2].
Analysis: Lack of training was a major
finding in most PMRs. Many COTRs had not attended the
NAVSUP-approved COTR training or refresher training in the
last three years as required by the reference above.
NRCC San Diego recommends updated COTR
training every three years to promote dialogue regarding
lessons learned, new policy and procedures, and discussions
on the impact that current procurement statutes and legal
decisions have on the COTR function [Ref. 7:p. 2].
Many of the COTRs and reviewers interviewed
voiced complaints concerning the content of the NAVSUP
course. They felt the course was too theoretical and legal-
istic and not tailored to the specific duties that COTRs must
face in the "real world."
Currently the only course fulfilling this
requirement is presented by Regional Procurement Management
staffs in the Naval Regional Contracting Centers and their
66
detachments. A new three to five day COTR course is in the
making at NAVSUP [Ref. 9].
c. Pricing Considerations
Table 2 reflects four PMR findings. Deficiencies
coming from Pricing Considerations are the result of inade-
quacies in pricing justification/documentation; price reason-
ableness; and use/availability of outside pricing assistance.
(1) Finding One. Price Proposal Technical
Analysis Deficiencies
Reference: FAR 15.805-4 states in part:
When cost or pricing data are required, the contracting
officer should generally request a technical analysis of
proposals, asking that requirements, logistics, or other
appropriate qualified personnel review and assess as a
minimum--quantities and kinds of material proposed, need
for the number and kinds of labor hours and the labor mix,
special tooling and facilities proposed, reasonableness of
proposed scrap and spoilage factors, and other data that
may be pertinent to the cost or price analysis. [Ref. 3]
Analysis: Technical analysis of price
proposals is complex and time consuming. It requires both
experience and attention to detail. Problems arise in this
area when COTRs develop a "rubber stamp" mentality. This was
evidenced in many PMRs. For example, the technical analysis
memorandum at one activity stated only, "I evaluate subject
cost proposal to be fair and reasonable. The labor categor-
ies and hours are appropriate for the task." No effort was
made to address the large hour discrepancy in the task order.
In other cases, the COTR approved the
contractor's proposal without significant comment and award
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was made in the proposed amount. The technical evaluation
performed by the technical codes often did not adequately
support acceptance of contractor's specific proposed hours
and labor categories, stating only that proposed hours and
categories were acceptable, without explaining why or
documenting specific supporting rationale for the determina-
tion. Most technical appraisals reviewed were preprinted
boiler plates signed by the COTR stating: "I have evaluated
the contractor's price proposal and the basis for my recom-
mending acceptance is set forth in the Contractor's price
proposal."
Any difference of the amounts noted in pro-
posals should be questioned, adequately addressed and
resolved. There is no room for a "rubber stamp" mentality
among the individuals who are relied on to monitor the
contractor's performance, but it exists. Several administra-
tive contracting officers (ACOs) said that when COTRs perform
this way, it becomes obvious that they do understand that
their job is to protect the Government. More attention to
detail is needed in the COTR work force. Specific rationale
is required to ensure a complete trail of accountability for
price determination is made.
The PMRs also revealed some examples of
complete, well-prepared technical analysis memorandums. In
one example, the COTR specifically noted the hours proposed
in a particular labor category were too high and requested
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the Ordering Officer obtain a clarification. Such attention
to detail allows the Ordering Officer the opportunity to do
substantive fact finding with the contractor and establish
realistic prenegotiation objectives. In the same memorandum,
the COTR noted differences in proposed hours for two addi-
tional labor categories. The explanation for the differences
was clear and logical and indicated obvious analysis was
accomplished.
A need for local activity instructions
providing additional detail on format and content require-
ments for technical analysis memos was expressed in inter-
views with COTRs. They cited insufficient time, lack of
experience and in-house COTR training as problem areas with
regard to the technical analysis of price proposals.
(2) Finding Two. Fact Finding by COTRs
Reference: FAR 15.805 states the Contract-
ing Officer/Ordering Officer is solely responsible for deter-
-ining the nature and extent of any fact finding which may be
required to formulate negotiation objectives. The technical
evaluation should provide the Ordering Officer with informa-
tion available within the Government and identify those areas
where information is not available. [Ref. 3]
Analysis: Documentation contained in
several files reviewed by PMR teams indicated technical codes
were conducting fact finding directly with the contractor.
For example, the COTR contacted the contractor to determine
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the necessity for a specific temporary technical position.
The Technical Evaluation Report subsequently endorsed the
category and the hours. This Lost should have been a ques-
tionable cost to be addressed during negotiations, thereby
ensuring the integrity of the technical evaluation, or
referred to other technical personnel within the Government
for a determination that such a labor category was or was not
appropriate for that task. Fact finding and negotiations
should be conducted only by the Contracting officer/ordering
Officer or in conjunction with a team effort under the cogni-
zance and control of the Contracting Officer/Ordering
Officer.
Interviews with contract administration
personnel pointed out that contractors themselves are guilty
of providing extra "help and clarification" to technical
personnel in order to canvass the Government's position.
Sometimes COTRs are guilty of weakening the Government's
position by unknowingly disclosing negotiation sensitive
information. In other cases, the COTR may overstep his
authority and purposefully commit the Government because of
urgency.
(3) Finding Three. Insufficient Prenegotiation
Planning Documentation
Reference: FAR 15.807(a) discusses the
process of determining prenegotiation objectives to help the
contracting/ordering officer judge the overall reasonableness
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of proposed prices and negotiate a fair and reasonable price
or cost and fee prior to award. The regulation requires the
contracting officer to analyze the offeror's proposal and
take into account any audit reports, technical analysis and
other pertinent data such as independent Government cost
estimates and price histories. FAR 15.807(b) states, "The
contracting officer shall establish prenegotiation objectives
before the negotiation of any pricing action," and prescribes
the scope and depth to support those objectives.
Analysis: Reviews of delivery orders
revealed inadequate evidence to show the preparation of
prenegotiation objectives by ordering officers at several
activities. It was recognized that not every order required
price negotiation; hence, not every order required prenego-
tiation objectives. However, many files revealed significant
differences between contractors' proposals and independent
Government cost estimates. While discussions were often held
with contractors, these files showed little evidence of
prenegotiation planning on the part of the Ordering Officers
working together with the COTR to establish a Government
position for presentation to contractors. For example, one
"Cost Ceiling Memorandum" form did not reflect contractor-
proposed "costs questioned." The entry on the "costs ques-
tioned column" is frequently "Yes," but in fact, it was the
Government estimate that was questioned, not the contractor's
cost. The documentation on file did not scrutinize or
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address rates. It did not consistently reflect the full
range of issues to be negotiated.
While it seems that the stifling burden of
paperwork never seems to stop in contract administration,
prenegotiation planning, with its accompaniment of documenta-
tion, is necessary to provide a clear audit trail for price
determination. In the above example, many correct actions
may have occurred, but were never documented in writing.
(4) Finding Four. Price Negotiation
Inadequacies
Reference: FAR 15.808(a) states:
At the conclusion of each negotiation of an initial or
revised price, the contracting officer shall promptly
prepare a memorandum of the principal elements of the price
negotiation. The memorandum shall be included in the
contract file and shall contain the.. .minimum information
(specified). [Ref. 3]
Analysis: A review of the delivery orders
revealed several inadequacies in negotiation techniques,
preparation of independent Government estimates and content
of the negotiation memorandum. Prenegotiation objectives
were not observed in many of the pricing situations. Several
delivery orders and modifications were issued in an amount
identical to both the Government estimate and the contrac-
tor's proposal which gave the impression to PMR inspectors
that Government estimates were not "independent" but rather
were prepared after the fact based on the contractor's
proposal. In another example, a negotiation memorandum
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indicated the proposal was phoned to the COTR who reviewed
the proposal and, by phone, stated the contractor's proposal
was acceptable. The reconciliation statement in the negotia-
tion memorandum contained conflicting figures.
More problems were exemplified in a review
where the significant variances in labor categories and
number of hours between the Government estimate and the
contractor's proposal were not addressed in the negotiation
memorandum. Instead, the memorandum referred to a memorandum
from the COTR and stated that "the COTR reviewed the contrac-
tor's proposal, provided a revised Government estimate and
accepts, in part, the contractor's proposal." The COTR
memorandum was vague and did not adequately address these
variances.
In another example, there were minimal
elements for an audit trail of negotiations and, when there
were negotiations conducted, it appeared they were between
the "task leader" and the contractor. Negotiations under a
cost reimbursement contract should be conducted by the
ordering officer assisted by the COTR. A price negotiation
memorandum (PNM) should then be prepared and signed by the
ordering officer documenting the key points and results of
the negotiations. Negotiations which fail to provide a firm
basis and specific rationale for determining a fair and
reasonable price are considered inadequate. Activities need
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to ensure that determination of price reasonableness is made
and documented in the file.
The reason cited by those interviewed for
most of these documentation deficiencies was urgency.
However, it seems that there is never enough urgency to go
back to document the transaction after the requirement is
met.
d. Contracting Administration
Table 2 reflects the six significant findings
from the reviews. This PMR chapter addresses adequacy of the
contract administration process including preparation of
mods, timely definitization of mods/orders, invoice proces-
sing, proper delegation to CAS, timely close-out of completed
files, and tracking audits; and adequate monitoring of
contractor performance to include: quality, delivery and
COTR performance review.
(1) Finding One. COTR/ACOTR/NTR Interface
Deficiencies
Reference: NAVSUPINST 4205.3 states, "an
'Alternate COTR' (ACOTR) may be nominated and appointed to
act in the absence of the ZOTR." [Ref. 7:p. 3] NRCCSDINST
4205.7 allows for a Navy Technical Representative (NTR) to be
assigned by the requiring activity to assist the COTR. [Ref.
8:p. 4]
Analysis: With regard to COTR/ACOTR assign-
ments, PMRs revealed that in several instances ACOTRs were
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performing the COTR's function much of the time, even when
the COTR was present. Several problems also arose with
ACOTRs who were unofficially assigned. The requiring
activity should be aware that unofficial assignment as ACOTR
to a person who does not possess technical expertise commen-
surate with the contract is not in the requiring activity's
best interest. There is a legitimate need for ACOTRs,
especially when the COTR's primary duties require him to
conduct extensive traveling and not be present to monitor
contractor performance. Several other problems were dis-
cussed during interviews with COTR personnel. Some COTR jobs
are difficult to perform as collateral duties when the
primary job takes them on travel for extended periods of
time. Without the assignment of an ACOTR several unnecessary
problems were created.
The NAVSUPINST 4205.3 aqsigns responsibility
to the COTR for reviewing and certifying contractor invoices.
During one PMR, it was learned that 20 technical points of
contact (TPOCs) had been assigned to monitor a contract.
They were responsible for monitoring individual delivery
orders and reviewed and certified invoices. Interviews by
PMR inspectors with two of the TPOCs revealed they were per-
forming adequately; however, the officially assigned COTR
should have been performing the final review and certifica-
tion of invoices. The COTR did indicate that semiannual
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meetings were held with the TPOCs to review contractor per-
formance and to identify any problem areas.
COTRs need to be in a position to properly
monitor contracts as assigned. The NRCCSDINST 4205.7 ensures
COTRs are fully supported through its provision for NTRs, but
the span of control afforded to NTRs needs to be kept in
perspective.
(2) Finding Two. Inadequate Monitoring of
Deliverables
Reference: The NAVSUP Publication 570
states that "data items to be provided by the contractor
shall be specified on a DD vorm 1423, 'Contract Data Require-
ments List' (CDRL), or included in the SOW." [Ref. l:p. 12]
Analysis: There were several instances
noted wherein data identified as deliverables on Contract
Data Requirements Lists (CDRLs) incorporated in contracts
were not being received. When the contracts were originally
negotiated these data were identified as deliverables. The
contractor presumably accounted for costs of report require-
ments in the proposal. The COTR must monitor and track
deliverables to ensure the government receives all contract
requirements.
Some CDRLs were not filled out properly.
For example, Block 8 was annotated for delivery incorrectly
and did not ensure that Government rights were maintained to
reject unsatisfactory data.
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The significance of appropriately annotating
the CDRL cannot be overemphasized. In many cases, the only
deliverables under a delivery order are data, and the total
cost to the Government may be significant in terms of
dollars. With no requirement for inspection and acceptance
of these data, the Government is waiving the right of rejec-
tion if the deliverable does not meet the Government's needs.
(3) Findinq Three. Documentation Discrepancies
Reference: NAVSUPINST 4205.3 outlines COTK
documentation responsibilities and refers to the "performance
of the specific duties assigned pursuant to the appointment
letter issued by the PCO." [Ref. 7:p. 4]
Analysis: Documentation discrepancies are a
function of administrative laxity, lack of proper hands-on
training and time constraints. They primarily occur in five
main areas. Those areas are: (1) Administration; (2)
Correspondence; (3) Contractor Performance; (4) Acceptance;
and (5) Invoices.
First, with reference to administration, one
PMR cited a situation where cost growth occurred without the
COTR ensuring funds were always available and critical paper-
work pertinent to the file was late or nonexistent. Another
COTR had to take over and attempt to complete the documenta-
tion. In addition, there were numerous modifications pending
where overruns had occurred and incorrect accounting data had
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been used. The COTR must act conscientiously and in a timely
fashion when involved with monitoring contractor performance.
Correspondence is the second area of
concern. Several COTRs stated they did not always maintain a
record of telephone conversations with the contractor or the
ordering officer. One COTR indicated he did not make a
written report of site visits to the contractor's plant which
was located out of town. Reports of any interaction with the
contractor, PCO, or ordering officer should be documented and
maintained in chronological sequence. These reports should
outline topics of conversation or visit, meeting partici-
pants, and any other significant details. Such substantive
records offer a clear trail of information for the ordering
officer and/or ACOTR. Experience teaches that this is
vitally important when disputes or claims arise. Such docu-
mentation also provides the COTR with a memorandum for
accountability and historical traceability.
The third area of concern entails the basis
which the COTR uses to measure contractor performance. What
is acceptable and what is not acceptable must be clearly laid
out. Areas that should be looked into include:
* Punctuality of performance
* Contractor responsiveness and cooperation
* Management availability/accessibility.
At one activity, three of the four COTRs maintained files
containing relevant documentation and a copy of the basic
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contract they monitored. However, during the interviews it
was revealed that none of the COTRs had ever completed the
required annual contractor performance report.
In the fourth area, acceptance, many files
lacked evidence to show technical analysis for the deliver-
ables. COTRs explained that if the deliverable was accepta-
ble, there was no need for analysis. However, there is a
need to document acceptance.
The fifth area needing attention is invoice
certification of receipt and acceptance of services. At one
activity, invoices submitted on Standard Form (SF) 1034 were
signed on the front of the SF1034 by the COTR. Then, for
payment purposes, the purchasing agent was signing Block 26
of the DD Form 1155. The contract invoicing procedures call
for the COTR to sign certifying the validity of the charges,
but not on the front of the SF1034. That block is for the
final certification by the disbursing officer. Block 26 on
the DD Form 1155 need not be signed for progress payments
under a cost reimbursement contract. For the final invoice,
or for invoices for deliverables, documentation of receipt
and acceptance should be accomplished by the person actually
receiving the deliverables, normally the COTR. PMRs cited
that the manner in which COTRs certify invoices was not
clearly evident nor was it documented in the files. In some
examples labor categories not included in the delivery order
were billed by the contractor and in turn certified by the
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COTR. In some cases, travel costs, material costs, and mis-
cellaneous charges specified in the delivery orders were not
clearly identified or supported on the corresponding invoice.
Since there are no prescribed procedures established to guide
the COTR's certification of invoices, COTR's appear to be
verifying contractor efforts and performance on a subjective
basis. While this is a problem in itself, the further
problem is that COTR files do not show documentation for
clear-cut rationale needed to determine the appropriateness
of work/materials invoiced. The main concern is whether or
not the COTR really knows that the Government received what
it paid for.
Improved COTR documentation and training is
necessary to correctly validate invoices and measure contrac-
tor performance. The PMRs suggested: (1) COTRs clearly show
and document criteria used to monitor contractor performance;
and (2) COTR files should show specific application of these
criteria to specific line items of work invoiced. The PMRs
also recommended categorizing contractor performance monitor-
ing reported by progress reports, daily/periodic progress
checks, with problems identified in meetings/telephone calls
in order to devise a subjective statement that could be
assembled to support the reasonableness of costs.
Several COTRs used automated daily log docu-
mentation procedures or hard copy formal and informal corres-
pondence documentation procedures. At activities which used
80
automated records, less COTR discrepancies were noted. Other
COTR files lacked the documentation. Interesting to note,
one COTR threw away all of his documentation when the
services were complete, but before all of the receipts were
correctly processed. Most files lacked evidence to show
technical analysis for the deliverables.
In conclusion, while overall file documenta-
tion contained contractual documents, CDRL submittals and
copies of invoices, documentation efforts must be reinforced
to ensure COTR files contain records of monitoring efforts,
technical analysis performed, accounts of meetings/discus-
sions with contractors, written input from other technical
support personnel and all other pertinent documentation to
support technical guidance provided to the contractor in
accordance with NAVSUPINST 4205.3.
(4) Finding Four. Inadequate Monitoring of
Contractor Performance
Reference: NAVSUP Publication 570
discusses the monitoring function and states: "ordinarily
this function is performed by the Contracting Officer, desig-
nated ordering officer(s) and COTR." [Ref. 'l:p. 10]
Analysis: The lack of proper monitor-
ing can cost the Government big dollars when contractors are
allowed to perform in a less than satisfactory manner. An
IDTC service contract at one activity deteriorated into one
of little value because the COTR failed to ensure that the
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contractor complied with the terms of the contract. Provi-
sions in the contract for specific CDRL items were totally
disregarded by the contractor with no evidence of attempts by
the COTR at enforcement. Additionally, other difficulties
were encountered because the contractor failed to invoice
correctly as service occurred. The contractor simply
provided a monthly statement without reference to delivery
orders or contract line items which unnecessarily complicated
reconciliation of work accomplished and invoice costs.
The PMRs indicated that monitoring
techniques employed by COTRs varied. One COTR tracked
contractor response time on a weekly basis in accordance with
the contract, attended contractor/ordering officer meetings
and had accomplished site visits. Other COTRs relied solely
on customer complaints. When the COTR does not regularly
monitor contractor performance, there is no evidence of
quality assurance and technical oversight. Failure to take
corrective actions (i.e., COTR reque- the PCO issue a cure
notice) in a timely fashion perpetuates poor performance and
effectively waives the right of the Government, if necessary,
to terminate for default. All COTRs should actively monitor
contractor performance and meet at least quarterly with the
PCO.
Interviews with ACOs indicated that this is
a serious problem with COTRs. One ACO stated that COTRs get
in trouble in this area for failing to act more so than
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acting wrongly. COTRs complain they are having to shoulder
more and more of the burden of having to perform contract
administration. They add that they do not feel they are
always used as the technical specialists/monitors they were
originally assigned to be.
(5) Finding Five. Discrepancies in Procedures
Used to Address Deficiencies
Reference: NAVSUP Publication 570 states:
"The COTR serves as the eyes and ears of the contracting
officer by acting as the technical liaison between the
contractor and the contracting officer." [Ref. l:p. 14)
Analysis: When the need arises for a
meeting between a requiring activity and the contractor
(except as required for contractor surveillance by QA or NTR
personnel) both parties should meet under the cognizance of
the COTR to ensure that the rights of the Government are
preserved and that the integrity of the contract is upheld.
High visibility is essential for the COTR function. This
imperative is a necessary control mechanism to ensure
contractor performance conforms to the terms and conditions
of the contract.
According to the majority of COTRs inter-
viewed, procedures to address discrepancies or deficiencies
vary from activity to activity. Several COTRs specifically
indicated "Other Technical Personnel" reviewed proposals
and/or liaisoned directly with the contractor. However, the
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COTR is the technical King Pin for all contractor status
reports, clarification inquiries, meetings and approval of
submittals. When these duties are carried out by other
personnel, the requiring activity is vulnerable to the
occurrence of constructive changes whenever issues involving
contract scope are not rapidly communicated to the COTR and
the ordering officer. At a minimum, the COTR should be
notified of the technical acceptability of deliverables and
all inquiries received to keep him updated so he can respond
quickly and directly to the contractor. Furthermore, the
COTR should coordinate all liaison activities with the
contractor pertaining to technical clarification in addition
to progress/status meetings. Many COTRs are technically
knowledgeable and administratively capable to perform these
tasks, but time constraints and primary job descriptions keep
them too busy to put in the time they would like to properly
perform COTR duties.
(6) Finding Six. COTR/Ordering Officer/PCO
Interface Deficiencies
Reference: NAVSUPINST 4205.3 specifies
regular meetings should occur and be attended by the PCO (or
ordering officer), COTR and requiring activity Commanding
Officer to discuss contract status and performance. As a
minimum, they would be held on a quarterly basis. [Ref. 7:p.
4]
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Analysis: Interviews with contracting per-
sonnel frequently indicated there is little communication
among PCOs, COTRs, ACOs and ordering officers. Several COTRs
disclosed interface problems with the Administrative Con-
tracting Officers (ACOs) regarding requests for modification
actions. Other COTRs stated that they neither conversed nor
interfaced in any way with designated ordering officers.
Though the COTR has direct access to the PCO via the
telephone, there is little communication between the two, or
with the contracting officer who has been delegated PCO
authority.
Contract terms on IDTC contracts require the
contractor to perform within the specified scope and ceiling
price of the orders or exceed them only upon direction of the
contracting officer. A lack of communication between COTRs
and contracting officers has the potential to lead to
unauthorized increases in the scope of work or cost overruns
without the benefit of the ordering officer's involvement
until after the problem is well underway. Because this
potential exists, close involvement of the ordering officer
is necessary in the progressing of tasks. All matters
pertaining to the administration of the contract should not
solely be conducted by the COTR without any further involve-
ment by the ordering officer except to execute delivery
orders against the IDTC. The ordering officer must be knowl-
edgeable of the contract and well aware of obvious problems,
85
questions and confusing terms and conditions. A record of
funds or manhours expended should be maintained by the
ordering officer as well as to ensure the terms and condi-
tions of the contract are properly administered. A close
working relationship needs to exist between the ordering
officer and the COTR to ensure compliance with the contract
terms and conditions such as property administration, fund
controls, invoicing procedures, quality assurance, and
integrity of delivery orders. In addition to the COTR's
oversight of the contractor, the PCO also has the oversight
responsibility of ensuring full traceability and adequate
performance of the COTR's duties.
D. PROBLEMS/ISSUES
It must be noted that standard PMR precepts are subject
to environmental influences. For example, the composition of
the inspection team impacts the PMR precepts. Precepts
change "by direction" depending on what issues higher author-
ity considers important enough to emphasize. They also
change between activities based on first or preconceived
impressions. And they change over time. However, none of
the inspected activities responded to the recommendations
with statements of nonconcurrence or inability to implement
them; therefore, the findings and recommendations are
considered to be well-founded. [Ref. 9]
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E. SUMMARY
Chapter III has presented a comprehensive analysis of the
Navy Field Contracting System environment in which the COTR
must perform as seen from the perspectives of Procurement
Management Review personnel at two large procuring activities
and 18 smb 1 purchase activities, as well as from the view-
points of contracting personnel associated with contract
administration and the COTRs themselves. It presented an
analysis of 15 COTR-related findings for large contracting
activities (greater than $25,000) and 17 findings for small
purchase activities (less than or equal to $25,000). Chapter
IV will answer the primary and subsidiary research questions,
present conclusions drawn from the findings and recommend
actions to address many of the significant deficiencies that
have been discussed pertaining to contract administration of
indefinite delivery type contracts by COTRs.
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IV. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides a summary of research and answers
the primary and subsidiary research questions posed in
Chapter I. It then presents conclusions and recommendations
drawn from the significant findings pertaining to the manage-
ment of Contracting Officer Technical Representatives (COTRs)
and Indefinite Delivery Type Contracts (IDTCs). Finally,
areas for future research will be discussed.
B. SUMMARY AND ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Summary
In the first chapter, the reader was presented with
the area of study and then walked through the framework on
which this thesis is built. Scope was limited. Research
methodology was explained.
Chapter II introduced background and defined the
process of establishing a service contract. The importance
planning plays in the making of a good statement of work
(SOW) was emphasized. The chapter continued with a discus-
sion of the IDTC and its three forms (i.e., Definite
Quantity, Requirements, and Indefinite Quantity). Advantages
and disadvantages were provided. Next, the chapter shifted
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focus from IDTCs to the policies and procedures associated
with the contract administration functions of the COTR.
Discrepancies taken from the Procurement Management
Reviews (PMRs) of West Coast Navy Field Contracting System
(NFCS) activities were analyzed in Chapter III. These
findings highlighted many of the deficiencies which plague
the administration of IDTCs from a PMR reviewer, PCO/ACO and
COTR viewpoint.
2. Answers to Research Questions
a. Primary Research Question
What are the key problems associated with the
administration of Indefinite Delivery Type Contracts (IDTCs)
through the Contracting Officer's Technical Representative
(COTR) and how might these problems be resolved?
The significant issues that resulted from the
analysis of the findings in Chapter III point toward the
following problems:
* Failure to involve the COTR in the early stages of
contract planning
* Poor communications between PCOs and requiring
activities
* Insufficient COTR training with regard to hands-on
practical exercises (e.g., invoice processing, resume
validation, etc.)
* Limited processing time driven by workload volume and
personnel shortages
* Laxity in contract administration documentation and
filing.
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The recommendations presented in the upcoming
section will suggest ways in which these problems might be
resolved.
b. Secondary Research Questions
(1) What is an IDTC? Indefinite Delivery Con-
tracts (IDTCs) specify the types of supplies and services to
be furnished by a contractor upon receipt of delivery orders.
Total funding under an IDTC cannot be predicted because there
is usually no limit to the number of delivery orders (with
the exception of Definite Quantity Contracts), which may be
placed against it. While a conveniently shorter administra-
tive time is a benefit of an IDTC, abuses by the requiring
activity can occur as documented in Procurement Management
Reviews (PMRs) at many Navy Field Contracting System (NFCS)
activities.
(2) What Role do COTRs Have in the Administra-
tion of IDTCs? Contracting Officer's Technical Representa-
tives (COTRs) are assigned by the contracting officer under
the rules of agency to provide technical direction/clarifica-
tion and monitor IDTC performance on the location at which
the contractor performs. While the Procuring Contracting
Officer (PCO) performs solely under the auspices of the Naval
Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP), the COTR assigned in the
contract performs assignment responsibilities both for his
own requiring activity and for the PCO.
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The Secretary of the Navy instruction (SEC-
NAVINST) 4205.5 answers this question quite well:
The following duties are general and not inclusive.
Greater specificity is highly desirable in assigning duties
to the COTR, as is direction about which documents relating
to the assigned duties should be maintained in the COTR
files.
Serve as Technical Liaison
Provide technical direction
Recommend corrective action
Ensure contract does not become personal services
Inform PCO of problems
Focal point for discussions with contractor on work issues
Ensure all tasking is necessary
Advise PCO on technical problems that could result in
claims
Provide technical clarifications of Statement of Work (SOW)
Provide independent Government estimate of desired or
ordered work




Review deliverables for acceptance
Prepare report on contractor performance
Ensure contractor complies with all reporting requirements
Review contractor plan for conducting the work
Monitor Cost/ProQress
Review invoices for appropriateness of types and quantities
of labor and materials
Report on contractor progress
Ensure costs are reasonable
Review contractor status/progress reports. [Ref. 6:Encl.1]
(3) What are the SiQnificant Deficiencies in the
Contracting Officer/COTR/OrderinQ Officer/Contractor
Relationship with Regard to the Administration of IDTCs?
Traditionally, there have been problems arising from the
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COTR's precarious position as the interface between the
contracting officer, the activity receiving the benefit of
the contract and the contractor. He may be instructed by his
supervisor to perform in a manner which conflicts with his
responsibilities to the contracting officer. In addition,
COTR responsibilities frequently get relegated below primary
duties and suffer from the lack of attention common in
collateral assignments.
The contracting officer cannot assign
clerical personnel as COTRs because the COTR must be
technically knowledgeable with regard to the contract
performance. However, the contracting officer cannot assign
full contract administration responsibilities to the COTR
because it is inappropriate.
The responsibilities of the COTR require him
to have a foot in several camps. He must liaison with the
contractor, but maintain an arms-length relationship. He
must work with the ordering officer, but maintain an adequate
separation of functional responsibilities. He must satisfy
his supervisor, but also monitor contractor performance for
the PCO.
Without proper management by their
commanding officer, stellar COTR efforts go unnoticed in per-
formance evaluations. Without proper management oversight by
their contracting officers, deficient contractor performance
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can be allowed to continue without proper corrective or
compensatory measures.
(4) How Might These Deficiencies be Addressed to
Improve the Administration of IDTCs? The stability and
effectiveness of the COTR work force is greatly enhanced by
proper qualification standards and training; however, the
"more training" philosophy is only one way to improve the
contract administration efforts. Current DON policy,
guidance, and practices pertaining to the implementation of
the COTR work force are adequate, though there is room for
improvement. However, the most significant action that must
be taken to resolve these problems is the reinstatement of
the program's intent. The program was designed for COTRs to
be monitors, not GS-1102 contract specialists.
Contracting officers must sell commanding
officers on the program. Commanding officers need to realize
that their support of the COTR's mission is in the best
interest of the command. The COTR helps to ensure the
activity is not subjected to fraud or unsatisfactory contrac-
tor performance. Contracting officers must also meet the
intent of the program themselves and initiate communication
with their COTRs, track contractor performance, and accept
rather than ignore responsibility for the contract.
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C. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Conclusions
a. First Conclusion: Failure to Involve the COTR in
the Early Stages of Contract Planning can Lead to
IDTCs Which are Difficult to Administer
Without the input of the COTR, an individual
experienced both technically and with regard to contract
administration, ambiguous statements of work and incomplete
contract coverage can occur. Once these contracts are in
service, administration frustrations flourish.
b. Second Conclusion: The Duties of the COTR are
Valuable and Need to Receive Higher Visibility
The analysis revealed that many COTRs are consci-
entious in their efforts, but lack support within their
command. For example, though COTRs spend on the average 20
to 25 percent of their time on COTR duties, in many instances
there are no inputs from the PCOs addressing COTR
performance, no COTR-related comments from line supervisors
reflected in COTR evaluations, and no mention of their COTR
responsibilities in their position description. While the
NAVSUPINST 4205.3 mandated COTR nomination letter requires
that the COTR function be included in an individual's
performance-rating element or explained why it is not,
documentation is deficient and management control is weak.
In another area, COTR reports frequently go
unread by PCOs at procuring activities. No feedback is given
to the COTR. Maybe if COTRs thought someone was reading
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their reports, then perhaps the ones who are deficient might
get motivated and respond in a more productive manner?
c. Third Conclusion: Communications Among PCOs,
COTRs, Ordering Officers and Commanding Officers
of Requiring Activities Need Improvement
Many of the findings cited in the analysis
chapter could have been avoided or minimized through better
communication. Policies are in place which support this need
for regular communication. Quarterly meetings as directed by
the NAVSUP COTR guidance are supposed to be held to discuss
contractor problems and to ensure COTR duties are carried out
consistently. Frequently, these meetings do not occur. The
PCOs say they are over-worked and do not have time to get
into the field. Base COs do not acknowledge contract
problems as their problems, but see them as "supply
problems." [Ref. 11] Interface between COTRs and ordering
officers at the requiring activity is also a significant
problem.
d. Fourth Conclusion: The COTR Training Program
Needs New Emphasis
The current NAVSUP COTR training course is not
adequate. The scope of the program, as well as the scope of
COTR duties, for that matter, is too broad. There is too
much attention on legalistic theory and not enough hands-on
practical exercises focusing on what the COTR will actually
do in his job. Currently, the training attempts to make GS-
1102's out of COTR candidates in five days. On-the-job COTR
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training was deficient at a significant number of NFCS
activities. Those activities that formally conducted COTR
training on a regular basis exhibited less deficiencies than
the activities that did not.
e. Fifth Conclusion: Contract Administration
Consumes an Increasing Amount of Time Spent by
Navy Field Contracting System (NFCS) Personnel
and COTRs
Limited processing time driven by workload volume
and personnel shortages contributes to the ineffectiveness of
contract administration. Time constraints foster the over-
tasking of individuals. Personnel shortages impact staffing
and alignment of duties. At the procuring activity, contract
administration backlog is not tracked adequately. The COTR
reports frequently get filed after only a cursory review. At
the requiring activity, the amount of time COTRs have to
perform their collateral COTR duties is frequently con-
strained because of the time required for primary duties.
f. Sixth Conclusion: Automated Systems are of
Benefit to the COTR and COTR Management Efforts
Comments on several PMRs made note of positive
contributions gained from the use of automated systems for
tracking financial and other areas of contract performance
and progress. Automated systems at the activities reviewed




Six recommendations are offered. The researcher
realizes the issue of COTR management is not new, nor is it
likely to go away. Much of the controversy stems from the
fact that the COTR function was established as a requirement
without the provisioning of any resources. But as long as
"contractors act like individuals at tax time," then someone
needs to monitor cost versus performance and that person is
the COTR. [Ref. 11]
a. Recommendation One: Involve the COTR in the
Early Stages of the Procurement Strategy
Development
The COTR, or individual who will become the COTR
upon PCO appointment, needs to be a part of the contract
planning team. The COTR can be of invaluable assistance when
determining SOWs and deliverable requirements. His involve-
ment can ensure that the contract administration plan is one
that can be executed with full compliance.
b. Recommendation Two: Establish a Certification
Program for COTRs Based on Training and
Experience
Several COTRs stated that they did not feel fully
qualified as COTRs solely as a result of attending the
NAVSUP-approved COTR training course. They felt technically
competent, but administratively overwhelmed. Some COTRs have
little technical experience, but years of experience as a
COTR. Other individuals may be extremely experienced tech-
nically, but have little COTR experience. Currently, PCOs
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have no way to calibrate the talents of the COTR nominees.
They must trust that the requiring activity has carefully
scrutinized the individual prior to his nomination. Even
though the assignment of COTRs can be made on a rather
subjective basis, these individuals are still the ones
entrusted to act in the best interest of the Government. A
certification as to an individual's level of experience as a
COTR would serve to help reduce COTR selection subjectivity.
c. Recommendation Three: Institute Joint Accounta-
bility for COTR Actions Between the PCO and
Requiring Activity's Commanding Officer
While the original intention of NAVSUP was to
issue a COTR instruction which would make the commanding
officer (CO) or chief technical director accountable for the
actions of the COTR, SECNAV realized that particular policy
might place NAVSUP (via NFCS PCOs) over other more senior and
more powerful major claimants' commanding officers, so the
accountability issue got translated into a quarterly PCO/CO/
COTR meeting [Ref. 11]. The PMRs indicate that these
meetings rarely occur. Still, there is a need for the
commanding officer to be more accountable for the actions of
the COTR. After all, the COTR is one of his employees. It
is recommended that NAVSUP solicit the support of the other
System Commands so that joint accountability can be incorpo-
rated into the COTR instructions, NAVSUPINST 4205.3, or
SECNAVINST 4205.5.
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If this recommendation is disregarded as a
correct measure to take, then at the very least, procedures
giving the PCO authority to send letters of noncompliance to
the COTR's commanding officer should be incorporated into the
instructions.
d. Recommendation Four: Make COTR Training Longer
or More Narrow, Concrete and Explicit
Though the breadth of COTR responsibilities will
probably always exceed the breadth of training received,
three to five days is insufficient time to cover the topics
related to COTR duties. Some of the areas currently covered
in COTR training are of a legalistic nature and make sense
pedagogically; however, contract administration personnel
question whether the course time might be better spent on
topics that are more job specific. Several COTRs expressed
to this researcher that more application-oriented case
studies (e.g., invoice processing, unallowable costs, resume
validation, etc.) would have been of more benefit to them as
new COTR candidates. Perhaps findings from recent PMRs could
be incorporated into the training program to illustrate the
kinds of problems the COTR trainees are likely to encounter.
e. Recommendation Four: Appoint a Dedicated COTR,
Given Certain Thresholds, to Perform Contract
Administration
This recommendation does not apply to all requir-
ing activities, but only to those that meet certain
thresholds relative to: (1) percentage of time the COTR is
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expected to spend on contract; (2) dollar value of average
delivery order; and (3) contract complexity (i.e., deliver-
ables, GFP, etc.). If the requiring activity refuses to
provide a dedicated individual, then actions could be
initiated to shift procurement authority to the requiring
activity and let them hire the procurement personnel neces-
sary to do the job themselves. While this recommendation is
rather simplistic, it is beyond the scope of this paper to
discuss the cost benefit effectiveness of centralized
procurement authority under NAVSUP versus decentralized
procurement at other major claimants.
Several COTRs felt that this "dedicated" COTR
recommendation might lead to an individual losing contact
with technology and thus losing the expertise required to
adequately perform the job.
f. Recommendation Six: Automate COTR Management and
Contractor Performance Reports
At NRCC San Diego, California, efforts have been
initiated to automate these reports [Ref. 11]. Several of
the requiring activities reviewed used electronic mail. The
automation process forces uniformity into the levels of
review. It requires internal processes to be logically
streamlined. Permanent records can be maintained in a data
base and/or in hard copy. It can be set up as an effective
audit system.
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D. AREAS OF FURTHER STUDY
1. The NAVSUP Publication 570 IDTC handbook strongly
advises that PCOs retain ordering authority in-house for
other than FFP IDTCs. Naval Regional Contracting Center
(NRCC) San Diego, California, delegates ordering officer
authority for IDTCs to its requiring activities; whereas NRCC
Philadelphia does not. Do they experience different levels
of contract administration problems?
2. The efforts to automate COTR management and
contractor performance reporting at NRCC San Diego,
California, need inputs to determine what information needs
to be reported, how the reports should be formatted and to
what extent access is made available [Ref. 11]
3. Naval Aviation Depot North Island, California has
written an excellent in-house handbook for COTR training
which incoiporates a wide variety of practical examples. A
training guide which provides practical exercises needs to be
written for NFCS use. [Ref. 12]
4. Contractor performance is monitored by other System
Commands, and other Services for that matter, in ways similar
to NAVSUP's COTR program. Would an analytical study of
strengths and weaknesses of comparable programs reveal






1. How many IDTCs requiring COTR involvement are written
or outstanding for services in a year?
2. What is the mean, range, and total of delivery orders
placed against service IDTCs, in dollars, over a
year?
3. How knowledgeable/qualified/motivated/capable is the
current COTR work force?
4. Are adequate incentives in play to promote COTR
involvement?
5. How are COTRs selected and trained?
6. What are the significant deficiencies in the COTR/
Contractor relationship with regard to the adminis-
tration of IDTCs?
7. Do these deficiencies promote abuses?
8. Which COTR responsibilities might be streamlined or
realigned to reduce these deficiencies?
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APPENDIX B
DOCUMENTATION FOR CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION PLAN
Ref: (a) NAVSUPINST 4330.7
Due to the nature of the effort described in Request for Con-
tractual Procurement (RCP) document number for
type of services, specialized technical expertise
is needed to ensure satisfactory contract completion. In
accordance with reference (a), the following information is
provided for use in developing the contract Administration
Plan (CAP) for the resulting contract.
PART I (To be completed by the Requiring Activity)
YES NO REMARKS
1. What type of service is to be
acquired? (The complete description
is included in the Statement of Work.)
Give executive summary below:
Specify:
a. Contract Support Services
(SECNAVINST 4200.31B)
(If yes, specify category in
remarks column)
b. Commercial Activity (CA)
(OPNAVINST 4860.7B)
c. Mess Attendant Services
(NAVSUPINST 4061.8D)
d. Computer Resources Services
(SECNAVINST 5231.1B)





2. What areas of the effort require
specific technical expertise to ensure
efficient contract administration?
a. Monitoring contractor performance




d. Drafts of data deliverables/
reports
e. Special personnel coordination
f. Other (Specify)
3. What activity in-house expertise
is available to assist in the contract
administration?
a. Project Manager (Name &
Position)
b. Ordering Officer (Specify
limitations/restrictions)
c. Technical Specialist




4. Where will the contractor be
required to perform?
a. On Government Installation
b. Contractor's Site
c. Various locations (Attach
a list specifying locations)
FOR INDEFINITE DELIVERY TYPE CONTRACTS (IDTC'S) COMPLETE THE
FOLLOWING:




c. Various individuals for the
COTR (Identify individuals)









7. Who will provide the appropriate accounting and
appropriation data? Specify how.
8. What type of funding is to be provided?
9. Who will request a proposal for an order if one is
needed? Specify how.
10. Who will review the proposal?
11. Who will issue the delivery order?
12. Who will inspect the services?







The above responses describe the extent of expertise and
availability within this activity. They are to be considered
by the PCO in developing the Contract Administration Plan
(CAP). I agree that successful contract administration will
require the expertise available at this activity.
Signature:
Commanding Officer/OIC or Designee Date
Typed Name and Title
106
PART II (To be completed by the PCO)




c. Technical questions before award
d. Technical questions after award
e. Post Award Conference
f. Authority to begin performance
g. Authority to proceed in emergency
h. Monitoring the services performed
i. Monitoring the direct cost of labor,
materials, travel, etc., on other
than firm fixed-price contracts
j. Monitoring of indirect costs on other
than firm fixed price contracts
k. Monitoring of contractor's labor
relations
1. Inspection of services
m. Acceptance of services
n. Subcontract approval
o. Travel Authorization
p. Overtime authorization, if allowed
under the contract
q. Monitoring of security
requirements
r. Government furnished property/
material
s. Other special requirements
(Specify)
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2. What are the COTR's specific duties?
3. If this is an IDTC, are there "minimum" and "maximum"
designated for hours, orders, quantities, etc.?
If yes, who will monitor to ensure the maximum is not
exceeded and the minimum is ordered?
4. Identify the schedule for submission of COTR's written
evaluation of contractor performance to the PCO.
5. How is the COTR to be reviewed for satisfactory per-
formance under the contract?
From this checklist, the contract administration plan was





Source: [Ref. 4:Encl. 1]
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APPENDIX C
GUIDELINES FOR DEVELOPING A CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION PLAN
The following outline provides general guidance for use
in developing a Contract Administration Plan (CAP) for
specific types of contracts. The type of contract, the type
of service, and the place(s) of performance are the major
contract terms which indicate to whom particular contract
administration functions would be assigned. Although a
function is assigned to a particular individual, this in no
way infers that assistance and coordination with others is
not necessary. The bottom line in developing any CAP is to
ensure cost effectiveness, quality and complete administra-
tion of the contract.
COST REIMBURSEMENT--PERFORMANCE ON GOVERNMENT SITE
a. CAO should be assigned those functions requiring
specialized expertise for proper audit to determine
allowability and allocability of costs incurred.
Also, those functions that are routine to the
contractor's everyday business.
b. PCO should retain all functions requiring coordina-
tion with various personnel outside the realm of the
Government site of performance (e.g., interagency
coordination).
c. COTR functions should be of a technical nature and/or
coordination with personnel on the Government instal-
lation. The COTR should assist to determine the
reasonableness of cost incurred by the contractor,
recommend or approve a need to travel in performance
of the contract, determine acceptability of subcon-
tracts and services rendered. COTR must submit the
required report to the PCO identifying the efficiency
of the contractor's performance and the use of the
deliverables received.
COST REIMBURSEMENT--PERFORMANCE AT CONTRACTOR'S FACILITY
a. PCO retains functions that provide oversight to
determine that schedule, funds and contract scope are
not exceeded.
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b. COTR should provide the technical expertise to both
PCO and CAO with regard to technical requirements,
reasonableness of costs incurred, travel required,
etc. COTR must submit the required report to PCO
identifying the efficiency of contractor's per-
formance and use made of deliverables.
COST REIMBURSEMENT--PERFORMANCE AT MULTIPLE SITES
a. CAP should be detailed and explicit as to those func-
tions retained by the PCO and those assigned to the
COTR.
b. PCO should retain management oversight functions to
determine that schedule, funds and contract scope are
not exceeded.
c. COTR to provide technical advice to PCO and ACO.
INDEFINITE DELIVERY TYPE CONTRACTS REGARDLESS OF THE PLACE OF
PERFORMANCE
a. Since this type of contract has the capability of
having various types of pricing terms, places of
performance, and authority, it is extremely important
that the CAP address those specific functions
assigned to each administration. The more complex
the contract, the more detailed the CAP should be.
b. Be sure to identify ordering limitations and
authority to those authorized to place orders.
c. CAO can generally best perform those functions
relating to the contractor's routine business, audit
and payment functions.
d. PCO should retain functions that provide management
oversight of all orders placed under the basic
contract.
e. Ordering Officers should be responsible for request-
ing, evaluating, negotiating, and determining the
price as fair and reasonable prior to placing an
order.
f. Ordering Officer should provide the PCO with adequate
information on orders issued for management oversight
to be effective.
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g. When determining the limitations and restrictions on
the placement of orders under the contract, the PCO
must consider the following:
1. The purchase authority of the activity authorized
to place orders.
2. The type and complexity of the anallsis and
evaluation that will be needed to make a fair and
reasonable price determination.
3. The functions of initiating, ordering, receipt
and certification of invoices should be performed
by separate individuals so as to avoid the
potential for fraud, waste and abuse and to avoid
any appearance of mismanagement of Government
funds or conflict of interest.
4. COTR duties should be based on the technical
expertise needed to perform those duties. If the
function is contractual in nature but requires
technical input to administer, the COTR should
provide recommendations and advice to the
contract administrator responsible for that
specific function.
Source: [Ref. 4:Encl. 2]
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APPENDIX D
SAMPLE CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION PLAN FOR A COMPLEX
IDTC TIME & MATERIALS SOLICITATION
CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION PLAN
In order to expedite administration of this contract, the
following delineation of duties is provided. The names,
addresses and phone numbers for these individuals or offices
shall be included in the contract award document. The
individual/position desig ated as having responsibility
should be contacted for any questions, clarifications or
information regarding the functions assigned.
1. PROCURING CONTRACTING OFFICE (PCO) is responsible for:
a. All pre-award information, questions, or data
b. Freedom of Information inquiries
c. Change/question/information regarding the scope,
terms or conditions of the basic contract document.
d. Post award conference.
2. CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION OFFICE (CAO) is responsible for
matters specified in FAR 42.302 and DFARS 42.302 except
in those areas otherwise designated herein.
3. DEFENSE CONTRACT AUDIT AGENCY (DCAA) is responsible for
audit verification/provisional approval of invoices and
final audit of the contract prior to final payment to the
contractor.
4. PAYING OFFICE is responsible for payment of proper
invoices after acceptance is documented.
5. CONTRACTING OFFICER'S TECHNICAL REPRESENTATIVE (COTR) is
responsible for:
a. Liaison with personnel at the Government installation
and the contractor personnel on site.
b. Technical advice/recommendations/clarification on the
statement of work.
c. The statement of work for delivery orders placed
under this contract.
d. An independent Government estimate of the effort
described in the definitized statement of work.
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e. Quality assurance of services performed and accep-
tance of the services or deliverables.
f. Government furnished property.
g. Security requirements on Government installation.
h. Providing Ordering Officer with appropriate funds for
issuance of the Delivery Order.
6. ORDERING OFFICER is responsible for:
a. Request, obtain and evaluate proposals for orders to
be issued.
b. Determine the price/estimated cost of the order is
fair and reasonable for the effort proposed.
c. Obligate the funds by issuance of the Delivery Order.
d. Authorization for use of overtime.
e. Authority to begin performance.
r. Certification of invoice for payment.
g. Monitoring of total cost of delivery orders issued.
The following limitations/restrictions are placed on the
Ordering Officer:
a. Type of order issued is limited by this contract to
pricing arrangements.
b. No order shall be placed in excess of $
without the prior approval of the PCO.
c. No order shall be placed with delivery requirements
in excess of
Source: [Ref. 4:Encl. 3]
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CONTACTING OFFICER'S TECHNICAL REPRESENTATIVE DUTIES
Ensure that services performed by the contractor remain
nonpersonal in nature and to ensure that the contractor does
not exceed the defined task or statement of work set forth in
the delivery order. Further, to monitor Delivery Order
performance and to ensure any violation or deviation from the
terms and conditions set forth in the D.O. are reported
promptly to the Ordering Officer first verbally and then
confirmed in writing.
Furnish technical instructions to the contractor which
provide specific details, milestones to be met, within the
terms of the contract or specific delivery orders thereunder,
and any other instructions of a technical nature necessary to
perform the work specified in the contract or delivery order.
Serve as the technical contact through whom the contrac-
tor can relay his questions and problems of a technical
nature to the ordering officer. The COTR is responsible for
all Government technical interface concerning the instant
contract/D.O.
Monitor contractor performance to see that inefficient or
wasteful methods are not being utilized and, if they are,
taking reasonable and timely action to alert the contractor
and the Ordering Officer to the situation.
Reviews and evaluates contractor's estimate to perform
work under: delivery orders, change orders or modifications
and furnishing comments and recommendations to the authorized
Contracting/Ordering Officer as appropriate.
Conduct surveillance of contractor performance to deter-
mine if the percentage of work performed reasonably corres-
ponds to the percentage of funds expended and alerting the
Contracting/Ordering Officer to any perceived difficulties
when such is not the case. This includes reviewing the
contractor's progress reports and furnishing the Ordering
Officer (as appropriate) written comments based on the
reports and your personal observations.
Review contractor invoices/vouchers, Certificate of Per-
formance and all supporting documentation in light of the
requirement, progress and other input, both documentary and
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from personal observation, to determine the reasonableness of
the billing and its comparability to other documents. The
COTR indicates complete or partial concurrence with the
contractor's invoice/voucher by executing the applicable
Certificate of Performance furnished by the contractor. This
review must be done efficiently and expeditiously.
The COTR alerts the Ordering Officer of any potential
performance problems; and if performance schedule slippage is
identified, determines causative factors and reports them to
the Ordering Officer with proposed actions required to
eliminate or overcome the causes and to recover the slippage
if feasible. Monitor the recovery according to the agreed
upon plan, and reports significant problems to the ordering
officer.
The COTR furnishes the Ordering Officer with any request
for change or modification including timely submission of
supporting justifications and other required documentation.
Monitoring, or causing to be monitored, contractor per-
formance using the technique of floor checks. This requires
actual on-site observation of contractor's employees
performing under the contract and the review of time cards/
sheets or labor distribution schedules to assure the proper
charging of time is taking place.
The COTR submits to the procuring Contracting Officer a
written evaluation of the performance of the contractor and a
statement as to the uses made of any deliverables furnished
by the contractor.
1. This report is made within 60 days of contract
completion but in no event less than annually within 60 days
of contract anniversary date. The written performance
evaluation would address the cost effectiveness, quality and
timeliness of contractor performance.
2. The following questions should be considered:
* Did the contractor use the key employees
identified in its proposal?
* Were the number of hours expended and the mix
of labor categories used consistent with level
of effort performed?
In surveillance of the contract performance, extreme care
must be taken to assure that the COTR does not cross the line
of personal services. In administering the contract, the
difference lies with the distinction between surveillance,
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which is proper and necessary, and supervision which is
illegal. Surveillance becomes supervision if the COTR should
go beyond enforcing the terms of the contract.
The COTR conducts resume reviews to establish that the
contractor personnel meet the contract qualifications
requirements stated in the basic contract. The COTR shall
ensure that all contractor personnel listed on acknowledge-
ment of notice are qualified.
A COTR's duties are not to issue any instructions which
would constitute a contractual change and are not to tell the
contractor how to perform, but only what is required of a
technical nature. If doubt exists as to whether information
to be furnished falls within the contractor scope of work,
the COTR contacts the Ordering Officer prior to transmitting
the information to the contractor.
The COTR does not possess the authority of a contracting
officer and, therefore, should not alter the terms and
conditions of the basic contract in any way. Knowing what
NOT TO DO is as important as knowing what TO DO, for a COTR.
COTR authority cannot be delegated.
The duties and responsibilities described above are not
intended to be all inclusive. As specific situations arise
that have not been covered or that have created a question,
these should be brought to the attention of the Ordering
Officer for advice on how to proceed in the best interest of
the Government.
Above all, the COTR's relationship with the contractor
must be beyond reproach. Accordingly, strict compliance with
DoD Directive 5500 and SECNAVINST 5370.2G regarding Standards




SAMPLE NAVY TECHNICAL REPRESENTATIVE NTR)
ASSIGNMENT LETTER
From: Commanding Officer, (Requiring Activity)
To: Mr(s). , Code
Subj: NAVY TECHNICAL REPRESENTATIVE (NTR); DUTIES THEREOF
Ref: (a) NRCCSDINST 4205.7 of 1 July 1988
1. You are hereby assigned as a Navy Technical Representa-
tive (NTR) under contract with . As
such, your duties are to assist the Contracting Officer's
Technical Representative (COTR) in executing the following
inspection and monitoring duties:
a. Identify contractor deficiencies to the COTR.
b. Review contract/delivery order deliverables, recom-
mend acceptance/rejection, and provide the COTR with documen-
tation to support the recommendation.
c. Assist in the preparation of the final report on con-
tractor performance for the applicable contract/delivery
order in accordance with the format and procedures prescribed
by the COTR.
d. Identify noncompliance with contractor reporting
requirements to the COTR.
e. Review the contractor plan for conducting specific
tasks/work/deliverables and identify problematic areas to the
COTR.
f. Review contractor status/progress reports on the
applicable contract/delivery orders, identify deficiencies to
the COTR, and provide the COTR with recommendations regarding
acceptance/rejection and/or government technical clarifica-
tion requests.
g. Report contractor progress for delivery order tasks
at least quarterly to the COTR (prior to quarterly PCO
meetings with the COTR).
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h. Review invoices for the appropriate mix regarding
types and quantities of labor and materials, and provide the
COTR with recommendations to facilitate COTR certification of
the invoice.
i. Provide the COTR with timely input regarding techni-
cal clarifications for the statement of work, possible
technical direction to provide the contractor, and recommend
corrective actions.
2. The COTR remains technically responsible for contractor
performance monitoring despite the assignment of NTRs, and
must ensure that input from the NTRs is accurate and appro-
priate to the scope of the contract and delivery/order. All
appropriate input from the NTR should be included with the
documentation in the COTR delivery order file in order to
maintain a trail or accountability.
3. The COTR must ensure that the contractor understands that
the COTR is the technical focal point for the contract and
all delivery orders, and that the NTR does not have the
authority to provide ANY technical direction/clarification
directly to the contractor.
4. Above all, your relationship with the contractor must be
beyond reproach. Accordingly, strict compliance with DoD
Directive 5500 and SECNAVINST 5370.2H regarding standards of
conduct and conflict of interest is required. You are
requested to read these instructions immediately.
5. This assignment shall remain in effect through the life
of the contract, unless otherwise relieved.




I have reviewed and understand my assigned duties and respon-
sibilities in connection with the contract/delivery order








SAMPLE COTR NOMINATION LETTER
From: Commanding Officer,
To: Contracting Officer, Naval Regional Contracting
Center
Subj: NOMINATION OF CONTRACTING OFFICER'S TECHNICAL
REPRESENTATIVE (COTR)
Ref: (a) NAVREGCONTCENINST 4205.1
1. In accordance with reference (a), I hereby nominate
Mr./Ms. as the COTR for the
contract resulting from requisition no. to
acquire services in support of .
2. Mr./Ms. is qualified to perform the
following COTR duties:
3. Mr./Ms. possesses the technical
knowledge and project/program office expertise required as
evidence by:
4. Mr./Ms. title, code, business
address, and phone number are:
5. Mr./Ms. has graduated from the Navy
approved COTR training within the last five years.
Place of training:
Dates of training:
6. The performance rating elements for Mr./Ms.






I have reviewed and understand my nomination and the duties,
responsibilities and limitations of the COTR function.
Si n t reignature:___________________________________________ Daaete: __________________
CONTRACTING OFFICER ACCEPTANCE:
Signature: ________________ Date: ______




From: PCO of the Applicable NFCS Activity
To: The COTR
Subj: APPOINTMENT AS CONTRACTING OFFICER'S TECHNICAL
REPRESENTATIVE (COTR)
Ref: (a) NAVSUPINST 4205.3; Subj: Contracting Officer's
Technical Representative (COTR)
(b) SECNAVINST 4205.5; Subj: Contracting Officer's
Technical Representative (COTR)
(c) SECNAVINST 4200.27A; Subj: Proper Use of
Contractor Personnel
Encl: (1) Contractsr Invoice Review Form
1. Pursuant to rc-erence (a), you are hereby appointed as
the Contractino ifficer's Technical Representative for:
Contract Number:
Contractor:
2. As COTR, your duties include functioning as the technical
representative of the contracting officer in the administra-
tion of the contract cited above; providing technical
direction and discussion as necessary with respect to the
specification or statement of work; and monitoring the
performance of work under the contract. You are to perform
your duties in accordance with references (a) and (b) and any
amplifying instructions provided herein or provided in
writing by the contracting officer at a later date.
3. In accomplishing your duties as a COTR you are cautioned
to carefully review and comply with reference (c) to ensure
that the contract does not become a personal services
contract through your actions or the actions of other Govern-
ment personnel who may assist you in the performance of your
duties.
4. You are responsible for bringing to the attention of the
rontracting officer, ordering officer (if the contract pro-
vides for issuance of delivery orders) and the functional
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code for whom the work is being performed, any significant
deficiencies with respect to contractor performance or other
actions which might jeopardize contract performance.
5. You are responsible for providing prompt notification to
the contracting officer if for any reason it becomes neces-
sary to terminate your appointment as COTR.
6. You are not authorized, either by this letter, or by
references (a) or (b), to take any action, either directly,
or indirectly that could result in a change in the pricing,
quantity, quality, place of performance, delivery schedule,
or any other terms and conditions of the contract (or
delivery order), or to direct the accomplishment of effort
which would exceed the scope of the basic contract (or
delivery order). Whenever there is the potential that
discussions may impact areas such as described above, contact
the PCO or Ordering Officer for guidance. You must be
especially cautious when providing an interpretation of
specifications. The understanding reached, or the technical
direction given, must be formalized in writing, and copies
provided to the contracting officer (ordering officer if a
delivery order is involved). The contractor shall be
notified that if the contractor is of the opinion that the
COTR's interpretation is erroneous, the contractor shall
notify the contracting officer (or ordering officer) in
writing of his/her position.
7. Specific duties, in addition to those required by refer-
ences (a) and (b) are as follows: (This section of the COTR
letter shall be tailored by the contracting officer to fit
the particular contract situation. The following are exam-
ples of direction which could be used for this tailoring.)
a. Responsible for controlling all Government technical
interface with the contractor.
b. Responsible for ensuring that copies of all Govern-
ment technical correspondence are forwarded to the contract-
ing officer (and ordering officer) for placement in the
contract (delivery order) file.
c. Responsible for promptly furnishing documentation on
any requests for change, deviation, or waiver (whether
generated by the Government or the contractor) to the
contracting officer (and ordering officer) for placement in
the contract (delivery order) file.
d. Responsible for completing and signing the Contractor
Invoice Review Form (enclosure (1)) for all contractor
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invoices and for forwarding copies to the PCO/ACO and Defense
Contract Audit Agency (DCAA).
e. In the event of contractor delay, or failure to
perform, determine the cause, and make recommendations for
appropriate corrective and/or preventive measures to the
contracting officer (and ordering officer).
f. Periodically check contractor performance to ensure
that the individual contractor employees are of the skill
levels required and are actually performing at the levels
charged during the period covered. Via the contracting
officer (ordering officer) request assistance from DCAA as
necessary.
g. Periodically check contractor performance to ensure
that the labor hours charged appear consistent and reason-
able, and that any travel charged was necessary and actually
occurred.
h. Ensure that any Government Furnished Property is
adequately monitored and accounted for.
Contracting Officer Signature and Date
COTR Signature (which constitutes Date
acceptance of the appointment and
conditions thereof)
(The COTR shall retain one copy of this letter, signed by
both parties, and shall return one copy to the contracting
officer (and ordering officer) within ten (10) days of
receipt, for placement in the contract file)




CONTRACTING OFFICER'S TECHNICAL REPRESENTATIVE (COTR)










The COTR will act as the Contracting Officer's represen-
tative for technical matters, providing technical direction
and discussion as necessary with respect to the specification
of statement of work, and monitoring the progress and quality
cf contractor performance. The COTR is not an Administrative
Contracting Officer and does not have authority to take any
action, either directly or indirectly, that would change the
pricing, quantity, quality, place of performance, delivery
schedule, or any other terms and conditions of the contract
(or delivery order), or to direct the accomplishment of
effort which goes beyond the scope of the statement of work
in the contract (or delivery order).
When, in the opinion of the contractor, the COTR requests
eftort outside the existing scope of the contract (or
delivery order), the contractor shall promptly notify the
contracting officer (ordering officer) in writing. No action
shall be taken by the contractor under such direction until
the contracting officer (or ordering officer) has issued a
modification to the contract (or delivery order) or has
otherwise resolved the issue.
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In the absence of the COTR named above (due to reasons
such as leave, illness, official travel), all responsibili-
ties and functions assigned to the COTR shall be the respon-
sibility of the alternate COTR acting on behalf of the COTR.
Source: [Ref. 7:Encl. 3]
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